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It is a fundamental principle of nearly every modern state that a 
large part of the expenses of the government should be met by way 
of taxation, rather than by way of loans or commercial 
enterprise. However, despite acceptance of this principle, there 
has been a traditional reluctance amongst the tax paying public 
to meet the taxation obligations imposed upon them by their 
governments. Thus, any study of the history of taxation reveals 
a basic conflict between, on the one hand, the need of the State 
to meet its expenditure requirements by means of exactions levied 
upon its citizens, and on the other, the desire of the citizen to 
retain as much of his wealth as possible without interference 
from the state. By way of example, Sabine records that when a 
poll tax (which is imposed on a per capita basis) was imposed in 
England in 1380 it appeared from the returns subsequently filed 
that the population of the country had fallen since the 
imposition of the previous poll tax in 1377 by nearly one half of 
a million. 1 Similarly, the preamble to Pitt's Act of 1799
2 
whereby income tax was first imposed records that an income tax 
was being introduced because of widespread evasion of an 
expenditure-type tax which had been enacted in the previous 
l . t . 3 par ,amen ary session. 
In the past the conflict has often manifested itself in armed 
confrontation. The struggle between the King and Parliament 
which ended finally in the execution of Charles I in 1649 and in 
the complete victory of Parliament over the monarchy in 1688 is 
attributable as much to the desire of Parliament to exercise and 
control the taxing power as to any religious differences. 
Similarly, the American War of Independence may be attributed in 
large part to onerous taxes imposed on the American colonies by 
4 England. 
1. Sabine A History of Income Tax (George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 
London, 1966) p.12. 
2. 39 Geo III C 13. 
3. 38 Geo III C 16. 
4. For an account of the various taxes levied on the American 
colonies prior to the War of Independence see J.Coffield 
A Popular History of Taxation (Longman, London, 1970) -pp-.~8 ..... 2--8~8-. __ ......______ riw UBRART 
ffCTORIA UN!VEHSlTY OF WELLINGTON 
2 
In the Twentieth Century the conflict between the State and the 
individual in the field of taxation has manifested itself in the 
ballot box, rather than on the battlefield. Thus, in the United 
Kingdom the Thatcher Government was elected in 1979 on the 
platform of smaller government and lower individual taxes, and in 
the United States the Republican presidential campaign was 
successful in 1980 on the same platform. 
But at the same time what has been referred to as the "tradition 
of evasion 115 has continued unabated. Indeed, that 
11 tradition 11 
has thrived under the stimulus of the high taxes which have 
characterised many nations during the period since the end of 
World War II. 
To counteract attempts on the part of the taxpaying public to 
reduce the incidence of taxation legislatures around the World 
have resorted to increasingly complex and sophisticated 
legislation which has required alteration on a regular basis.
6 
However, notwithstanding that phenomenon opportunities invariably 
remain open for taxpayers to reduce their liability to tax. In 
some circumstances such a reduction may be effected with the 
sanction of the statute imposing the tax. Thus, in New Zealand, 
it is possible to reduce one's liability to tax by assigning an 
income producing asset to another person provided that the 
requirements of section 96 of the Income Tax Act 1976 as to the 
duration of the assignment and the control of the assigned 
property are met. In other circumstances, such a reduction may 
occur in the face of the statute: where, for example, a taxpayer 
conceals income falling within the statutory charge to tax. 
Therefore whatever method is adopted it generally remains 
possible, despite the sophistication of modern tax legislation, 
5. Sabine, op. cit. p.15. 
6. E.g. the New Zealand Income Tax Act 1976 required two 
amending Acts in 1982 and three in 1983. Many of the 
provisions contained in those Acts had as their objective 
the counteraction of measures adopted by taxpayers to reduce 
their liability to tax. 
3 
to avoid the full measure of taxation which the legislature seeks 
to exact. However, at the same time, without derrogating from 
that general proposition, the scope for some classes of taxpayers 
to reduce their liability to tax may be narrower than for others. 
In particular, the salary and wage earner is unable to avail 
himself of opportunities to reduce the incidence of taxation to 
the same extent as other taxpayers. Due to the source deduction 
principle, whereby tax payable by salary and wage earners is 
required to be deducted by the employer prior to the payment of 
the salary or wage,
7 such taxpayers must meet their day to day 
needs and plan for the future out of tax-paid income. Unlike the 
self-employed businessman, the salary and wage earner cannot 
easily deal with his income before it is derived by him. 
Assignment of personal services income is precluded for tax 
purposes by Henry J. 's holding in Spratt v C.I.R.
8 that: 9 
No taxpayer can, by way of assignment, escape 
assessment of tax on income resulting from 
his personal activities - such income always 
remains truly his income and is derived by him 
irrespective of the method he may adopt to 
dispose of it. 
And furthermore, as tax is deducted by the employer at source, 
there is no scope, without the complicity of his employer, for a 
salary or wage earner to evade tax by concealing his income. 
One of the few avenues whereby the incidence of taxation may be 
reduced for a salary or wage earner is by the provision of what 
are commonly known under the rubric "fringe benefits". 
Richardson and Congreve define fringe benefits as follows:-
10 
7. E.g. s.338 of the Income Tax Act 1976 (New Zealand); s.221 C 
Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Australia). 
8. [1964] N.Z.L.R. 272. 
9. Ibid. 277. For a criticism of this holding see McKay "The 
Arcus and Personal Services Income Principles" (1974) 6 
N.Z.U.L.R. 140, 153-156. 
10. Richardson and Congreve Ta x Free Fringe Benefits (Rydge 
Publications, Sydney, 1975) p.3. 
4 
In its widest sense the term 'fringe benefits' 
means any benefits or advantages, other than 
the payment of wages and salary, passing from 
employer to employee and arising out of the 
employment. Fringe benefits are usually 
paid in kind rather than in cash and 
include a wide range of goods, services, and 
other employee benefits. 
To be distinguished from fringe benefits are what may be referred 
to as conditions of employment. Whereas fringe benefits 
constitute the provision of a benefit or advantage in lieu of 
salary or wages, conditions of employment which include for 
example luxurious office surroundings, air conditioning, and the 
provision of secretarial services, confer no economic advantage. 
This paper is concerned only with the tax status of fringe 
benefits. 
Fringe benefits are provided in a multitude of forms. The use of 
company property, such as motor vehicles, holiday accolTIITiodation 
and car parking facilities; the provision of free or low-rental 
accommodation and subsidised meals; access to low interest loans 
and the granting of share options; the payment of club membership 
and of entertainment expenses; and the provision of 
superannuation and insurance benefits; to name but a 
more common forms, all constitute fringe benefits. 
few of the 
\./ith the 
stimulus of high rates of taxation currently enjoyed in many 
countries, fringe benefits have become a common method of 
compensating employees. In New Zealand, for example, a perusal 
of any daily newspaper reveals numerous advertisements with 
offers of attractive salary packages with benefits provided. To 
take but a minor example, the business pages of one metropolitan 
daily newspaper recently surveyed contained advertisements for 
two accountants offering in one case an "executive salary and 
benefits and a company car", and in the other a "competitive 
salary and a company house"; for a training and personnel officer 
offering "subsidised superannuation and other benefits"; and for 
a computer sales representative offering "a base salary, car 
allowance or company vehicle".
11 
11. The Dominion,, Wellington, New Zealand, 30 June 1984, 
pp.12-13. 
5 
Fringe benefits are corrunon at all income levels. They are not 
the prerogative of the highly paid. Thus, the managing director 
of a large public company may be provided with a company car and 
a low interest housing loan as well as having his telephone bills 
and annual holidays paid for. But at the same time an office 
clerk in the same company may receive fringe benefits 
corrunensurate with his or her income level: for example he or she 
may be provided with subsidised meals and be entitled to 
membership of a subsidised superannuation scheme. 
The paper undertakes a comparative study of the taxation of 
fringe benefits. To that end the tax statuts of fringe benefits 
in New Zealand, Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom and the 
United States will be considered. In format, the paper first 
analyses the reasons why fringe benefits developed as a useful 
tax avoidance measure for the salary and wage earner. Then, the 
methods adopted to counteract such avoidance will be discussed. 
That discussion is divided into two parts. First, a study is 
made of general anti-avoidance provisions whereby fringe benefits 
of all types are brought within the charge to tax. And secondly, 
the tax status of two specific fringe benefits - company cars and 
rent free or low rent accommodation - is considered in detail. 
At the time of writing fringe benefits remain largely outside the 
tax net in New Zealand. Be that as it may, the purpose of this 
paper is not to construct an argument advocating a change in that 
tax-free status, or, on the other hand, advocating a maintenance 
of the status quo. Nor is it intended to provide a descriptive 
commentary on the legislation governing fringe benefits in the 
jurisdictions surveyed. Rather, this paper undertakes an 
analytical appraisal of the reasons for the exclusion of fringe 
benefits from the tax net and of the general scheme of 
legislation adopted in several jurisdictions to ensure that these 
benefits are brought within that net. 
6 
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II. FRINGE BENEFITS AND THE INCOME TAX BASE 
A. Background 
In each of the jurisdictions considered fringe benefits have been 
a valuable tax planning device for the salary or wage earner. In 
New Zealand, Australia, Canada and the United Kingdom, this may 
be attributed in large part to the means by which income is 
defined for income tax purposes. In the United States, on the 
other hand, the statutory definition of income is wide enough to 
encompass fringe benefits but administrative practice has enabled 
many such benefits to escape the tax net. 
Various statutory provisions have been enacted to ensure that 
fringe benefits are taxable in the hands of the employee. These 
provisions are considered in Parts III and IV of the paper. 
This part of the paper is concerned more with the reasons why 
such express statutory provisions have been rendered necessary. 
To that end, an analysis of the concept of income is undertaken. 
That analysis is approached from a number of perspectives. 
First, income is considered in its economic sense. It will be 
seen that in this sense income is clearly wide enough to 
encompass fringe benefits. Secondly, income will be considered 
in its juristic sense and a brief discussion of the meaning of 
income as enunciated by the courts will be undertaken. At the 
same time, an analysis of the various statutory definitions of 
income, and the historical background to such definitions, will 
be undertaken. As a result of this second approach, it will be 
seen that in New Zealand, Australia, Canada and the United 
Kingdom fringe benefits are not taxable as income in the ordinary 
sense of that word unless they are convertible into cash. It 
will also be seen that the convertibility principle applies only 
to income from employment and not to income from other sources. 
Finally, a comparison will be made with the United States where 
income in its ordinary sense is wide enough to encompass fringe 
benefits. 
7 
B. The Concept of 11 Income 11 • 
1. Income in the economic sense. 
An American economist, H. Simons, has defined income as 
b . 12 erng : 
... the algebraeic sum of (l) the market value of 
rights exercised in consumption and (2) the change 
in the value of the store of the property rights 
between the beginning and end of the period in 
question. In other words, it is merely the result 
obtained by adding consumption during the period 
to 'wealth' at the end of the period and then 
subtracting 'wealth' at the beginning. 
Such a definition is clearl y wide en ough to encompass not only 
items such as salaries, wages, rent, interest, dividends and 
business profits, which are currently taxed as income, but also 
items such as inheritances, windfall gains, capital gains and 
fringe benefits which are not currently so ta xed. Thus, in 
assessing the market value of rights exercised in consumpt i on it 
would be necessary, for example, to take into account the market 
value of the use of a company car, or of the right to live in 
rent free accommodation. 
However, economic concepts of income have not played a 
significant role in the development of income as a legal concept 
for tax purposes. Neither legislatures nor the courts have 
availed themselves of economic theories. In a Canadian case, 
Oxford Motors Ltd v Minister of National Revenue,
13 this neglect 
of economic thoery was explained as follows:
14 
No one has ever been able to define income in terms 
sufficiently concrete to be of value for taxation 
purposes. In deciding upon the meaning of income, 
the Courts are faced with practical considerations 
which do not concern the pure theorist seeking to 
arrive at some definition of that term ... 
12. H. Simons, Personal Income Taxation (University of Chicago 
Press, 1938) p.50-51. Another American economist, R.M.Haig, 
has defined income in similar terms as "the rno nEy val ue of 
the net accretion to one's economic power between two points 
in time" (cited in Curran (ed) Ta x Philosophers (University 
of Wisconsin Press, 1974) p.80). 
13. [1959] C.T.C. 195. 
14. Ibid. 202, per Abbott J (S.C). 
8 
And in a similar vein the Supreme Court of America, in Merchants 
Loan & Trust Co. v Smietanka,
15 held that:
16 
In determining the definition of the word 'income' 
this court has consistently refused to 
enter into the refinements of lexicographers or 
economists and has approved what it believed to 
be the conunonly understood meaning of the term 
which must have been in the minds of the people 
when they adopted the Sixteenth Amendment to the 
Constitution. 
Thus, for practical reasons, the courts have rejected a broad 
based definition of income founded upon economic theory. 
Legislatures appear to have ignored economic theory for similar 
reasons. In the United Kingdom the Royal Commission on the 
Taxation of Profits and Income
17 accepted that income could be 
calculated by comparing the value of total resources at the 
beginning of the year with total resources at the close and by 
making adjustments for incomings and outgoings. However, that 
method of calculating income was rejected as being 
11 unworkable 
for income tax, for by no possibility could a system be operated 
which involved a fresh determination each year of the curre nt 
values of all the possessions of the taxpayers of the country.
111 8 
2. Income in the juristic sense. 
Although each of the countries surveyed in this paper imposes a 
tax on income in none of the statutes by which income tax is 
imposed is there to be found a comprehensive definition of the 
term 11 income 11 • The common pattern is to describe a number of 
receipts which are to be included as income for tax purposes and 
to conclude with a general provision which brings all classes of 
income not specifically mentioned within the tax net. In the 
United Kingdom, for example, Schedules A to E of the Income and 
Corporation Taxes Act 1970 describe on a source basis a number of 
receipts which are chargeable to tax. Case VI of Schedule D then 
operates as a general sweeping up clause by rendering taxable 
11 any annual profits or gains not fa 11 i ng under any other case 
of Schedule D, and not charged by virtue of Schedule A, B, C, or 
E. II 
15. 255 U.S. 509 (1921). 
16. Ibid. 519. The significance of the Sixteenth Amendment to 
the Constitution in the context of income tax in the 
United States is considered later in the paper. 
17. June 1955, Cmnd 9474. 
18. Ibid. para 83. 
9 
Similarly, section 65{2) of the New Zealand Income Tax Act 1976 
provides that the assessable income of any person includes a 
number of items listed in paragraphs (a) through to (k) and 
concludes in paragraph (l) that it is also to include "Income 
derived from any other source whatsoever." Threfore, although a 
rather detailed list of items are included within the meaning of 
the term "income" for New Zealand tax purposes, the definition 
contained in section 65(2) is by no means comprehensive. 
Furthermore, the generality of the section 65(2) definition is 
emphasized by the opening words of that subsection, 
11 [w]ithout in 
any way limiting the meaning of the term ... 
11 The effect of those 
words was considered in Duff v C.I.R.
19 There, Woodhouse P., 
discussing the predecessor of section 65(2),
20said: 21 
... for reasons of logic alone the question as to 
whether a gain or profit is to be regarded as 
income should be examined initially by reference 
to the general considerations which surround that 
concept before any further step is taken of 
asking whether use can properly be made of the 
extended meanings of assessable income that are 
provided in para (a), (b) or (c) of section 
88(1). The subsection itself suggests such an 
earlier approach; and if it is not done the 
resulting analysis could well be diverted and 
restricted to the ambit of the extended 
definitions with consequential neglect of 
general principal. 
In Australia and the United States income is defined first by a 
general provision which includes within the definition income 
from all sources, and then by a list of specific items which are 
expressly included within the definition. Thus section 6l(a) of 
the United States Internal Revenue Code 1954 defines "gross 
income" as "all income from whatever source derived, including 
19. [1982] 2 N.Z.L.R. 710. 
20. Section 88(1) of the Land and Income Tax Act 1954. That 
section is in pari materia with section 65(2). 
21. [1982] 2 N.Z.L.R. 710, 712-713. 
10 
( but not 1 imited to) the f o 11 owing items: 
11 whereafter 
there follows a list of fifteen items. And section 25 of the 
Australian Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 provides that 
assessable income includes "the gross income derived directly or 
indirectly from all sources." Section 26 then lists fifteen 
items which are expressly included within "assessable income
11
• 
In considering income in its juristic sense it is therefore 
necessary to go beyond the statutory definition. This principle 
is well illustrated in the following comments of Jordan C.J. in 
21 
Scott v Commissioner of Taxes (N.S.W.): 
The word 'income' is not a term of art, and what 
forms of receipts are comprehended within it, and 
what principles are to be applied to ascertain 
how much of these receipts ought to be treated as 
income, must be determined in accordance with the 
ordinary concepts and usages of mankind, except 
in so far as the statute states or indicates an 
intention that receipts which are not income in 
ordinary parlance are to be treated as income, or 
that special rules are to be applied for 
arriving at the taxable amount of receipts. 
However, the "ordinary concepts and usages of mankind
11 test is 
not entirely satisfactory so the courts have developed a number 
of criteria for determining whether a particular receipt is 
income. First, income is something which comes in in money or 
money's worth. In Lambe v I.R.c.
22 Finlay J. said:
23 
[I]ncome means that which comes in, and ... it refers 
to what is actually received. Income may be of 
various sorts ... but none the less the tax is a tax 
on income. It is a tax on what in one form or 
another goes into a man's pocket. 
Secondly, a receipt is more likely to be income if it is received 
with a degree of periodicity, recurrence or regularity.
24 And 
finally, whether or not an item is income in nature depends upon 
. h t . th h d f th · · t 
25 
its c arac er 1n e ans o e rec1p1en . 
21. (1935) 35 S.R. (N.S.W.) 215, 219. 
22. [1934] 1 K.B. 178. 
23. Ibid. 182. 
24. F.C.T. v Dixon (1952) 86 C.L.R. 540. 
25. Scott v F.C.T. ( 1966) 117 C.L.R. 514,526 per Windeyer J
. 
11 
Applying those criteria to fringe benefits it would appear that 
they are income in nature. Fringe benefits generally come in to 
the taxpayer in money's worth if not in money. Thus the use of a 
company car for private use is clearly something which comes into 
the taxpayer in money's worth. Fringe benefits may also be 
received with a degree of periodicity, as with the provision of 
subsidised meals for example. Moreover, in the hands of the 
employee fringe benefits appear to have the character of income. 
They are provided in money's worth as a means of reward for 
services rendered. Therefore, prima facie it appears that fringe 
benefits are income in the juristic sense, and should be taxed 
accordingly. Indeed, in the United States that is the case and 
the Supreme Court has on several occasions held that the 
statutory concept of income is wide enough to encompass fringe 
benefits. 26 In the other jurisdictions surveyed, however, the 
courts have consistently held that fringe benefits are not income 
in the hands of employees unless they are either in the form of 
cash or are convertible into cash. As it is a relatively simple 
matter to provide a fringe benefit in a non-convertible form the 
charge to tax may easily be avoided. 
The rationale of the convertibility principle is not immediately 
apparent. Morever, it is not immediately apparent why the 
convertibility principle applies to employment income but not to 
other types of income. To understand the rationale and the 
employment-non-employment distinction, it is necessary to digress 
briefly into an historical consideration of income tax. 
c. The History of Income Tax and the Convertibility Princple. 
1. The United Kingdom. 
The first income tax was introduced by Pitt in 1799 in order to 
finance the war with France. The excise duties and land and 
26. C.I.R. v Smith 324 U.S. 177 (1945) (share options); Rudolph 
v U.S. 370 U.S. 269 (1962) (expenses paid trip). 
expenditure taxes which had characterised the English tax system 
for much of the Eighteenth Century provided insufficient revenue 
for that purpose and Pitt was forced to resort to loans. In 
order to reduce dependence on loans Pitt adopted two fiscal 
measures. First in 1798 an expenditure tax on certain luxuries 
was imposed.
27 However, that tax was widely evaded as a result 
of which Pitt adopted the second measure in 1799: the imposition 
f 
. 28 
o an income tax. 
By section 3 of Pitt's Act a tax was imposed upon "all income 
arising from property in Great Britain ... or from any kind of 
personal property ... or from any profession, office, stipend, 
pension, employment, trade or vocation ... " The Act therefore 
taxed income from certain sources, thereby reflecting the 
Eighteenth Century concept of income as being the yield from a 
productive source. That concept is well illustrated in the 
following excerpt from the works of Adam Smith :
29 
Whoever derives his revenue from a fund which is his 
own must draw it either from his labour, from his stock, 
or from his land. The revenue derived from labour is 
called wages. That derived from stock, by the person 
who manages or employs it, is called profit. That 
derived from it by the person who does not employ it 
himself, but lends it to another, is called the 
interest or the use of money .... the revenue which proceeds 
altogether from land, is called rent, and belongs to the 
landlord ... All taxes, and all the revenue which is 
founded upon them, all salaries, pensions, and 
annuities of every kind, are ultimately derived from 
some one or other of those three orginal sources of 
revenue, and are paid either immediately or mediately from 
the wages of labour, the profits of stock, or the rent 
of land. 
27. 38 Geo Ill. C 16. 
28. 39 Geo III. C 13. The preamble to this Act explains the 
reasons for the introduction of the income tax as follows: 
We your majesty's most dutiful and loyal subjects ... 
being desirous to raise an ample contribution for the 
prosecution of the war; and taking notice that the 
provisions made for that purpose, by an Act in the 
last session of Parliament ... have in sundry instances 
been greatly evaded, and that many persons are not 
assessed under the said Act in a just proportion to 
their means of contributing to the public service; 
have cheerfully and voluntarily given and granted ... the 
... duties hereinafter mentioned ... 
29. Smith An In uir into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth 
of Nations Reprint Landem, Ne son & Sons, 865 Bkl .VI 
p22. 
13 
It will be seen from the preceding discussion of income that 
Smith 1 s description of revenue is similar in many respects to 
current concepts of income. 
Pitt 1 s Act was repealed in 1802 but an income tax was reimposed 
by Addington in 1803 when the war with France resumed.
30 
However, Addington's Act was significantly different in form in 
that it introduced a schedular system whereby income was 
classified into five schedules according to its source. Pitt's 
income tax had been unpopular largely because the return required 
disclosed too much information about the taxpayer
1 s total income. 
Therefore, to meet the criticism that income tax returns 
represented an intrusion into taxpayers• private affairs the five 
schedules were introduced and taxpayers were required to submit 
a return in respect of income derived from each source. 
Addington 1 s Act is significant for a number of reasons. The 
schedular system it introduced is still part of the income tax 
regime in the United Kingdom. And for the first time a source 
deduction system was introduced whereby tax was required to be 
deducted at the source of the payment subject to tax. However, 
more importantly for present purposes, the origins of the 
convertibility principle may be traced to that Act. Schedule E 
of the Addington 1 s Act brought into charge income from 
11 every 
public office or employment of profit.
11 The first rule to the 
Schedule provided : 
The said duties shall be charged on the person or 
persons respectively having, using, or exercising such 
offices or employments of profit, or to whom such 
annuities, pensions or stipends shall be payable, for 
all salaries, fees, wages, perquisites, or profits 
whatsoever accruing by reason of such offices, 
employments or pensions ... 
And perquisites were defined in the fourth rule to the Schedule 
as : 
... such profits of offices and employments as arise 
from fees or other emoluments, and payable either 
by the Crown or the Subjects, in the course of 
executing such offices or employments. 
30. 43 Geo III C 122. 
14 
It was from these provisions, carried forward into the Income Tax 
Act of 1842, that the House of Lords abstracted the 
convertibility principle in 1892 in the landmark decision of 
Tennant v Smith.
31 There, the House of Lords was concerned with 
the question of whether an 
under Schedules D and Eon 
for him by his employer.
32 
employee of a bank was assessable 
the value of accommodation provided 
Their Lordships recognised that by 
virtue of his occupation of the rent-free accommodation the 
taxpayer received an economic benefit. Lord Halsbury L.C. 
"d 33 sa 1 : 
It may be conceded that if he did not occupy it 
under his contract with the bank rent free, he 
would be obliged to hire a house elsewhere, pay 
rent for it, and pro tanto diminish his income. 
And if any words could be found in the statute 
which provided that besides paying income tax 
on income, people should pay for advantages 
or emoluments in its widest sense ... , there 
is no doubt of Mr. Tennant's possession of 
a material advantage, which makes his salary 
of higher value to him than if he did not 
possess it and upon the hypothesis which I have 
just indicated would be taxable accordingly. 
However, notwithstanding the fact that the taxpayer derived a 
material benefit that benefit was not one which their Lordships 
considered to be taxable on a construction of the language of 
Schedule E. Lord Halsbury L.C. centred on the word "payable" in 
the fourth rule to Schedule E
34 and concluded that it was "quite 
impossible to suppose that the mere occupation of a house is 
reconcilable with the just application of that word.
1135 His 
Lordship considered that the only interpretation consonant with 
the language used in Schedule E was that that schedule charged 
only money payments or substantial things of money value capable 
of being turned into money. 
Lord Watson's judgment was in similar terms, being based upon a 
close analysis of the language of Schedule E. His Lordship 
"d 36 sa, : 
31. [1892] A.C.150. 
32. Schedule D levied a tax "upon the annual profits or gains 
arising or accruing to any person or persons residing in 
Great Britain from any kind of property whatever ... or from 
any profession, trade or vocation." 
33. [1892] A.C. 150,155. 
34. In relevant part the fourth rule is set out above. 
35. [1892] A.C. 150,156. 
15 
It is clear that the benefit, if any, which a bank 
agent may derive from his residence in the bank is 
neither salary, fee, nor wages. Is it then a per-
quisite or a profit of his office? I do not think 
that it comes within the category of profits, because 
that word, in its ordinary acceptation, appears to 
me to denote something acquired which the acquiror 
becomes possessed of and can dispose of to his 
advantage - in other words money - or that which can 
be turned into pecuniary account. If the context had 
permitted, it might have been possible to argue 
that a benefit of that kind was a perquisite. But 
the fourth rule of Schedule E defines perquisites, for 
a 11 purposes of the Act, to be II such profits of offices 
and employments as arise from fees and other 
emoluments, and payable either by the Crown or by the 
subject in the course of executing such offices or 
employments." (Lord Watson's emphasis). 
From Tennant v Smith it may be conluded that the convertibility 
principle in the United Kingdom is attibutable to two main 
factors. First, it may be attributed to the manner in which 
income from employment was defined in Addington's income tax Act 
of 1803. 37 Rather than defining income as being any form of gain 
the 1803 Act reflected Eighteenth Century concepts of income as 
being the yield from a productive source. And the yield from 
labour was defined in that Act in terms connoting monetary 
payments, or payments in kind which are convertible into money . 
Secondly, the convertibility principle may be attributed to 
judicial attitudes to the interpretation of tax statutes. This 
attitude is best illustrated by Lord Halsbury's opening words:
38 
This is an Income Tax Act and what is intended 
to be taxed is income. And when I say 'what is 
intended to be taxed, 1 I mean what is the intention 
of the Act expressed in its provisions, because 
in a taxing Act it is impossible, I believe, to 
assume any intention, any governing purpose in the 
Act, to do more than take such tax as the statute 
imposes ... Cases, therefore, under the Taxing Acts 
always resolve themselves into a question whether or 
not the words of the Act have reached the alleged 
subject of taxation. Lord Wensleydale said, in 
In re Micklehwait [11 Ex 456], 'It is a well-
established rule, that the subject is not to 
be taxed without clear words for that purpose ... 
1 
36. Ibid. 159. The other members of the House agreed with the 
convertibility principle. Lord Macaghten, for example, 
held that Schedule E 11 extends only to money payments or 
payments convertible into money. 11
 Ibid. 163. 
37. The 1842 Act which was considered in Tennant v Smith was 
largely based upon the 1803 Act. 
38. [1892] A.C. 150,154. 
This literal approach is clearly illustrated in the dicta of Lord 
Halisbury L.C. and Lord Watson already quoted.
39 Although their 
Lordships recognised that the provision of rent-free 
accommodation provided the taxpayer with a material advantage, a 
literal interpretation of the charging provisions excluded that 
advantage from the tax net. By contrast, the Scottish Court of 
Session, the appeal from whose decision the House of Lords heard 
in Tennant v Sn1ith, took a more pragmatic approach.
40 There, the 
majority held that the annual value of the occupation of the 
house was income. The Lord Justice-Clerk
1 s judgment in 
particular contains a useful contrast to the judgments in the 
House of Lords. Basically, his Lordship
1 s reasoning consisted 
of an assertion that it would be 
11 contrary to common sense 1Al to 
suggest that an employee would not consider a house provided by 
his employer to be a profit, gain or emolument of his office. 
Stating the principle to be applied broadly, the Lord 
Justice-Clerk concluded that 
11 it is what a man enjoys ... upon 
which he must be assessed for income tax.
1142 Had that rationale 
been accepted by the House of Lords then all manner and form of 
fringe benefit would have been brought within the charge to tax. 
However, the convertibility principle subsequently enunciated by 
the House of Lords successfully excluded the majority of such 
benefits from the charge. 
In the context of Schedule E the converibility principle has more 
recently been approved by the House of Lords in two cases 
concerning fringe benefits: Abbott v Philbin,
43 and Heaton v 
Bell . 44 In the former, the taxpayer was granted an option to 
purchase 2000 shares at their market value of 68s.6d a share for 
-:f20. The taxpayer exercised the option in respect of 250 shares 
two years later when the market value had risen to 82s. a share. 
The question falling for determination in the House of Lords was 
39. Supra, n33, n36 and accompanying text. 
40. Tennant v Inland Revenue Session Cases Series 4 Vol .18, 
428 (1891). 
41. Ibid. 434. 
42. Idem. 
43. [1961] A.C. 352. 
44. [1970] A.C. 728. 
whether the taxpayer had received a taxable perquisite when the 
option was granted or when it was exercised. It was freely 
conceded by the taxpayer that he had received a taxable 
perquisite, but he argued that it was received upon the granting 
of the option rather than when the option was exercised. In the 
House of Lords their Lordships unanimously agreed that the proper 
test to apply was that enunciated in Tennant v Smith. Applying 
that test, the majority held that the option was convertible when 
granted, as at that time the taxpayer could have exercised the 
option and then disposed of the shares for a cash 
consideration. 
The second case, Heaton v Bell, concerned the assessability of 
benefits received under a car loan scheme. Under that scheme the 
taxpayer 1 s employer purchased cars, insured them, paid the road 
fund tax, and lent them to the members of the scheme. There was 
then subtracted from the weekly wage of those employees a sum of 
money which varied according to the type of car on loan. 
Provision was made for withdrawal from the scheme at two weeks 
notice, after which time the deduction from the employee ' s 
weekly wages would cease. On the grounds that the participants 
in the scheme were receiving taxable emoluments, the 
Commissioners assessed the taxpayer - a member of the scheme - on 
his total wages without making any allowance for the amounts 
subtracted in respect of the car. The taxpayer disputed that 
assessment, arguing that as the benefit derived from the use of 
the car was not convertible into cash, he had derived no 
emoluments within the terms of Schedule E. 
In the House of Lords the taxpayer
1 s argument was rejected on the 
grounds that the benefit he derived from the scheme was 
convertible into cash. Once again the convertibility principle 
was unanimously approved. Lord Reid rationalised that approval 
as follows: 45 
Income tax is a tax on income and income means 
money income. The words profits and gains are 
used throughout the legislation in reference to 
sums of money ... there is no provision for the 
valuation in money or other kinds of advantages 
45. [1970] A.C. 728, 744. 
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which one might call perquisites. In 1842 income 
tax was at the rate of a few pence in the pound, 
'fringe benefits' were unknown for there was no 
incentive to create them, and it appears to me 
to be clear that there was no intention to saddle 
the commissioners with the difficult and at times 
unprofitable task of putting money on advantages 
arising out of the employment which did not sound 
in money. 
Therefore, rather than slavishly following Tennant v Smith Lord 
Reid sought to explain the convertibility principle by reference 
to the probable intention of Parliament when the 1842 Act was 
enacted. Lord Diplock also accepted the convertibility principle 
but at the same time indicated that if it were not for the 
history of Schedule E, he would be prepared to hold that the use 
of the car was a perquisite irrespective of whether or not it was 
convertible into cash. His Lordship said:
46 
For my part, if it were permissible to confine 
myself to a consideration in the current 
Statutes (namely the Income Tax Act 1952 and 
the Finance Act 1956) by which income tax 
under Schedule Eis currently charged, I 
should have little hesitation in deciding that 
the free use of a car for his own purposes, 
provided to an employee by an employer by 
reason of his employment, was a perquisite from 
that employment ... I have no doubt that the 
man in the street would call the benefit of 
the use of the car if not a 'perquisite' at any 
rate a perk. 
Lord Diplock was therefore of opinion that according to current 
usage the use of the car was a perquisite. However, His Lordship 
held that it was too late "to read the relevant words of the 
current legislation in what I should regard as their current 
acceptation 1147 as Tennant v Smith had confined these words to 
money payments and payments in kind which were convertible into 
cash. 
As in Abbott v Philbin, although there was general agreement as 
to the requirement of convertibility, their Lordships were 
divided as to whether or not the car benefit was convertible into 
cash. The majority held that the benefit was convertible on the 
grounds that by giving two weeks notice the taxpayer could have 
withdrawn from the scheme and received money instead of the use 
of the car. 
46. Ibid. 763-764. 
47. Ibid. 764. 
2. New Zealand and Australia. 
As in the United Kingdom, fringe benefits are not generally 
taxable in New Zealand unless they are convertible into cash. 
The requirement of convertibility has arisen in New Zealand for 
reasons similar to those for its development in the United 
Kingdom. Thus, both the method of defining income for tax 
purposes and judicial attitudes to the interpretation of tax 
statutes have been influential. At the same time, the 
converibility requirement has not arisen as the result of the New 
Zealand courts blindly following principles enunciated by the 
House of Lords in Tennant v Smith. Rather, it has developed upon 
an independent construction of the relevant New Zealand 
legislation, section 65(2) of the Income Tax Act 1976. In 
relevant part that section provides : 
Without in any way limiting the meaning of the 
term, the assessable income of any person shall 
for the purposes of this Act be deemed to include, 
save so far as express provision is made in this 
Act to the contrary, -
(a) ... 
(b) All salaries, wages, or allowances (whether 
in cash or otherwise), including all sums 
received or receivable by way of bonus, 
gratuity, extra salary, compensation for 
loss of office or employment, or emolument 
of any kind, in respect of or in relation 
to the employment or service of the 
taxpayer: 
Whether the provision of a fringe benefit attracted the operation 
48 
of that section fell to be considered in Stagg v I.R.C. There, 
the taxpayer's employer paid for a trip to England for the 
taxpayer and his wife. Considering the cost of those air fares 
to be an allowance within the terms of section 65(2)(b),
49 the 
Commissioner included an equivalent amount within the taxpayer's 
assessable income in the relevant income year. The taxpayer 
objected, first on the ground that the purpose of the trip was 
wholly or primarily of a business nature so that in 
48. [1959] N.Z.L.R. 1252. 
49. In Stagg the relevant statutory prov1s1on was s.88(1)(b) of 
the Land and Income Tax Act 1954. However, as that 
prov1s1on is identical to s.65(2)(b) of the 1976 Act the 
latter provision will be referred to in the text for the 
sake of convenience. 
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effect the cost of the trip was not an allowance, and secondly on 
the ground that on the authority of Tennant v Smith no benefit to 
a taxpayer could be assessed as income unless it was convertible 
into cash. 
The taxpayer's first ground of objection was given short shrift 
by Hutchison ACJ. The learned judge upheld the finding in the 
Magistrates Court that the trip was for both business and 
personal reasons. However, it is Hutchison ACJ 1 s treatment of 
the second ground of objection that is of greater significance 
for present purposes. Although the taxpayer's submissions had 
been based largely on Tennant v Smith, his Honour approached the 
question by analysing section 65(2)(b). Relying on dicta in 
Edwards v Commissioner of Taxes,
50 the learned judge held that 
11 allowance 11 must be read ejusdem generis with 11 salaries
11 and 
11 wages 11 • Applying that rule, his Honour held that certain 
characteristics of salaries and wages had a bearing on the 
meaning of 11 allowances 11 • These were: first, that they are in 
relation to an employment or service; secondly, that they are 
payable under a contract of service and not as a gratuity; 
thirdly, that they are paid in money, although it was recognised 
that this factor was affected by the words 11 (whether in cash or 
otherwise) 11 ; and fourthly that they are paid periodically. 
Bearing these factors in mind the learned judge concluded that 
11 allowances 11 refers generally to sums of money. The words 
11 (whether in cash or otherwise) 11 were given effect to by the 
application of the principle that if a taxing provision is 
reasonably capable of two alternative meanings then the courts 
will prefer the meaning more favourable to the taxpayer. Thus, 
the words in parenthesis were given a narrow interpretation:
51 
Having regard to the strong indications that there 
are in the paragraph that 1 allowances 1 contemplate 
payments in money, I agree with counsel for the 
appellant that the words 1 (whether in cash or 
otherwise)' must be read so as to include within 
50. [1925] G.L.R. 247. In particular reliance was placed on 
the following observations of Sir Robert Stout CJ: 
First, the word 'allowance' as used in [section 
65(2)(b)] is mixed up with other terms such as 
salaries, wages, allowances, bonuses, gratuities, 
extra salary and emoluments of any kind. These 
are all to be read together as the class which 
is dealt with under paragraph [(b)] .. the ejusdem 
generis doctrine, in my opinion, must be applied 
(ibid.248). 
51. [1959] N.Z.L.R. 1252, 1257. 
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'allowances' only such prov1s1on for an employee as, 
if it is not in cash, is convertible into cash by 
him. 
Hutchsion ACJ derived support for this conclusion from the fact 
that the Legislature felt it necessary to enact what is now 
section 72. This section deems accommodation benefits to be 
assessable income. If the word "allowances" encompassed the 
non-monetary benefits brought to charge by section 72, then, his 
Honour considered, there would have been no need to enact that 
provision. Further support was derived from the fact that no 
machiney was provided in section 65(2)(b) for the valuation of 
non-monetary benefits which were not convertible into money. 
Finally, the learned judge pointed out that support for his 
conclusion could be found in Tennant v Smith. At the same time, 
however, his Honour emphasized that cases decided on English 
taxing provisions were ''[not] necessarily authoritativE on an 
interpretation of our [section 65(2)(b)J.
52 Moreover, it is 
quite clear from the analysis of section 65(2)(b) undertaken by 
Hutchison ACJ that the convertibility principle was arrived at 
independently of any dicta in Tennant v Smith. Therefore, while 
the approach taken by the House of Lords in Tennant v Smith and 
by Hutchison ACJ in Stagg v IRC was similar, the holding in Stagg 
was not a mere reiteration of that in Tennant v Smith. 
That the convertibility principle has been adopted in New Zealand 
is hardly surprising. As with the United Kingdom legislation, 
the New Zealand Act defines income according to its source. And 
as with the United Kingdom the definition of income derived from 
labour is expressed in monetary terms. Furthermore, judicial 
attitudes as to the proper manner in which taxing statutes should 
be interpreted are largely the same - hence the reference in 
Stagg to the principle enunciated in IRC v Ross & Coulter 
(Blackrock Distllery Co. Ltd)
53 that any ambiguity in a tax 
statute should be resolved in the taxpayer's favour. 
In Australia the convertibility principle is more closely 
associated with the holding in Tennant v Smith than in New 
Zealand. Upon an analysis of the Australian legislation, this 
difference is difficult to explain. Income tax is imposed 
52. Idem. 
53. [1948] 1 All E.R.616. 
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by the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936. By section 25(1) of that 
Act, a person's assessable income includes that person's "gross 
income". This is complimented by section 26 which provides a 
list of specific items which are to be included in assessable 
income. Finally, "income from personal exertion" is defined in 
section 6(1) as meaning: 
Income consisting of earnings, salaries, wages, 
commissions, fees, bonuses, pensions, superannuation 
allowances, retiring allowances ... the proceeds of any 
business carried on by the taxpayer ... any profit 
arising from the sale by the taxpayer of any property 
acquired by him for the purpose of profit making by 
sale ... 
However, the section 6(1) definition does not define income. As 
54 
Jordan CJ stated in Scott v C. of T.: 
The definition section, where it deals with income, 
does not define it ... Nor does it define 'income 
from persona 1 exertion 1 • It merely enumerates, 
by way of illustration, various forms of income 
which are to be treated as derived from personal 
exertion. 
Thus whether a particular item is income in nature falls to be 
determined according to ordinary concepts, rather than by the 
statutory provisions. It follows, therefore, that the 
converibility principle in Australia has arisen due to the 
courts' perception of what constitutes income according to 
ordinary usage, rather than to a close analysis of the statute. 
This is well illustrated by FCT v Cooke and Sherden.
56 There, a 
soft-drink manufacturing company ran a scheme whereby free 
holidays were made available to certain retailers of its 
products. Under the terms of the scheme if the offer of the 
holiday was not accepted, the retailers would not be entitled to 
alternative compensation. The holidays were therefore not 
convertible into cash. However, the Commissioner assessed the 
taxpayers on the basis that the holidays were income according to 
ordinary concepts and that therefore their value constituted 
assessable income by virtue of section 25(1). 
54. (1935) N.S.W. 35 S.R. (N.S.W) 215, 220. 
55. Ibid. 219. 
56. (1980) 10 A.T.R. 696. 
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The Federal Court, compr1s1ng Brennan, Deane and Toohey JJ, 
allowed the taxpayers' appeal. First, their Honours held that 
the scheme of the legislation required income to be expressed as 
. t 57 a pecuniary amoun : 
An item of income which could not be reckoned as 
money could not find its way into taxable income 
so as to be subjected to tax at a rate declared 
by the Parliament. And s.20 requires that incoffie 
wherever derived and expenses wherever incurred 
be expressed in terms of Australian currency. So 
the Act sufficiently shows that the items of income 
are to be reckoned as money. Consistently with 
this notion, the Act makes particular provision 
for some non-pecuniary receipts by including 
within assessable income the value of these 
receipts (see s.26(e) and s.26(ea)), and this 
brings a pecuniary amount to tax. The notion 
that the items of income are money or are to 
be reckoned as money accords with the ordinary 
concepts of income as 'what comes into [the] pocket' 
to adapt Lord Macnaghten's phrase in Tennant v 
Smith ... that is not to say that the income 
must be received as money; it is sufficient if 
what he receives is in the form of money's worth. 
The Court's holding that according to ordinary concepts inco~e 
must be in the form of money or money's worth has long been 
recognised as a correct statement of the law.
58 . Applying that 
test it would be expected that the holidays under consideration 
were income as constituting money's worth even though they were 
not actually convertible into money. However, the Federal Court 
took the matter one step further and held that not only must the 
particular item be money's worth, but it must also be convertible 
into money. Their Honours said:
59 
If a taxpayer receives a benefit which cannot 
be turned to pecuniary account, he has not 
received income as that is understood according to 
ordinary concepts and usages. 
Furthermore: 60 
57. Ibid. 703. 
58. Scottish & Canadian General Investment Co.Ltd. v Easson 
(1922) S.C. 242; Cross v London & Provincial Trust [1968] 
1 All E.R. 428, 430. 
59. (1980) 10 A.T.R. 696, 704. 
60. Ibid. 705. 
If the receipt of an item saves a taxpayer from 
incurring expenditure, the saving is not income: 
income is what comes in, it is not what is saved 
from going out. A non-pecuniary receipt can be 
income if it can be converted into money, but 
if it be inconvertible, it does not become 
income merely because it saves expenditure. 
In arriving at that conclusion, the Federal Court placed heavy 
reliance upon Tennant v Smith. Although the learned members of 
the Court recognised that the legislation under consideration in 
that case differed from the Australian legislation, they 
considered that the dicta as to convertibility were of general 
application and were not limited to the terms of the legislation 
under consideration. 
The correctness of the decision in Cooke & Sherden will be 
considered in the next section of this paper under the heading 
11 Employment v non-employment income: is the converibility 
principle universal . 11 Suffice it to say for present purposes 
that in Australia the convertibility principle has been adopted 
for reasons quite distinct from those which marked its adoption 
in New Zealand. Whereas in New Zealand the converibility 
principle is attributable to the terms of the statute, in 
Australia it is due to the implementation of the Tennant v Smith 
rationale. 
3. Employment v non-employment income: is the converibility 
principle universal? 
The provision of fringe benefits is traditionally associated only 
with the employment relationship. This is due not to the fact 
that for the self-employed opportunities for tax planning are so 
great that recourse to non-monetary benefits is not necessary, 
but rather to the fact that the convertibility principle applies 
only to income from employment. By way of example, if a company 
provided trips to Hawaii for partners in a law firm which had 
acted on its behalf then these partners would be assessable on 
the value of the trips provided. According to ordinary concepts 
of income, as opposed to those applying to employment income, a 
receipt is income if provided in money or money's worth. So long 
as payment in kind is in money's worth, it is not a prerequisite 
to the treatment of such payment as income that it be convertible 
25 
into money. Although on the face of it Tennant v Smith may 
appear to contradict that proposition, a close analysis of their 
Lordship's judgments in that case indicates that the 
convertibility principle was arrived at on a construction of 
Schedule E of the 1842 Act rather than on an analysis of general 
concepts of income. Thus, in discussing Schedule E,
61 the first 
rule of which brought into change certain items, including 
11 perquisites 11 which were 11 payable 11 , and the fourth rule of which 
defined 11 perquisites 11 as meaning 11 profits 11 of employment arising 
from fees or other 11 emoluments 11 , Lord Halsbury LC said:
62 
... none of the words, either 'perquisites,' 'profits,' or 
'emoluments,' are properly applicable, inasmuch as by the 
rule in which these words are used or explained, the 
word 'payable' as applied to them renders it quite 
impossible to suppose that the mere occupation of a 
house is reconcilable with the just application of 
that word. 
His Lordship then went on to say that things of money value 
capable of being turned into money could fall within Schedule E. 
However, quite clearly his Lordship's conclusion was based upon 
the fact that non-convertible benefits could not be 
11 payable 11 • 
Lord Watson's judgment was in similar terms, although his 
Lordship thought that the converibility principle extended to 
Schedule o. 63 
Lord Hannen also arrived at the convertibility principle on 
similar grounds to Lord Halsbury L.C. His Lordship said:
64 
... I am of op1n1on that the occupation of this 
house does not fall within the description of 
1 .salaries, fees, wages, perquisites, profits 
or emoluments' in the sense in which these words 
are used in the Act. 
In Cooke and Sherden, however, the Tennant v Smith rationale was 
given under application. Their Honours held:
65 
61. In relevant part Schedule E is set out above. 
62. [1892] AC 150, 155. 
63. Reproduced in relevant part supra n.32. 
64. [1892] AC 150, 165. 
65. ( 1980) 10 A. T. R. 696, 703-704. 
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Although Tennant v Smith ... was concerned with the 
operation of legislation different in structure 
from the Income Tax Assessment Act, some parts 
of their Lordships' speeches applied ordinary 
conceptions to the construction of the terms of 
the Act there under consideration. Thus Lord 
Halsbury said at 157:-
'I came to the conclusion that the Act 
refers to money payments made to the 
person who receives them, though, of 
course, I do not deny that if 
substantial things of money value 
were capable of being turned into 
money they might for that purpose 
represent money's worth and be 
therefore taxable.' 
... And Lord Watson at 165 held that 
'profits in its ordinary acceptation, 
appears to me to denote something 
acquired which the acquirer becomes 
possessed of and can dispose of to 
his advantage - in other words 
money - or that which can be turned 
to pecuniary account.' 
With respect, the dicta from Tennant v Smith cited in Cook and 
Sherden are not illustrations of "ordinary conceptions" being 
applied to the Act as their Honours suggest. Rather, they are 
merely illustrative of the conclusions reached in the House of 
Lords upon a close construction of Schedule E. The comments of 
Lord Halsbury which are quoted were made after his Lordship had 
analysed the language of Schedule E and concluded that the mere 
occupation of a house was not reconcilable with the use of the 
word 11 payable 11 in that Schedule. And the quotation from Lord 
Watson's judgment has been extracted from his Lordship's 
discussion of the word "profits" as used in Schedule E. In the 
context of that quotation, Lord Watson was not discussing 
ordinary concepts of income. Therefore, it follows that the 
quotations from Tennant v Smith are not authority for the 
propositions for which they were cited in Cook and Sherden. 
The approach adopted by the Federal Court in Cooke and Sherden 
was also adopted by McMullin Jin Dawson v C.I.R.
66 There the 
taxpayer subscribed to debenture stock in a television rental 
company under a debentureholders colour television plan. 
66. (1978) 3 N.Z.T.C. 61,252. 
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Under that plan subscribers would receive the use of a television 
free of charge for five years in lieu of interest. The 
Commissioner assessed the taxpayer under section 65(2)(1) on the 
basis that he had received "income from any other source 
whatsover 11 • Relying on Cross v London and Provincial Trust Ltd
67 
where it was held that income includes money or money's worth, 
the Commissioner argued that the use of the television rent free 
represented money's worth upon which an assessment could properly 
be made. McMullin J rejected this argument, preferring instead 
the taxpayer's submission that as the use of the television was 
not convertible into cash the benefit thereby derived was not 
income. In reaching that conclusion the learned Judge placed 
reliance upon both Tennant v Smith and~ v IRC. As has 
already been indicated in the discussion of Cooke and Sherden, 
the holding in Tennant v Smith was based on a construction of 
Schedule E of the 1842 Act which brought to charge certain 
receipts associated with employment. With respect to McMullin J. 
his Honour was incorrect in extracting from Tennant v Smith the 
propos i tion that the convertibility principle is of general 
application. The better view is that Tennant v Smith is only 
authority for the proposition that non-monetary benefits which 
are not convertible into cash are not perquisites under Schedule 
E of the United Kingdom Act. McMullin J's reliance upon Stagg is 
also open to criticism. As indicated in the discussion of that 
case in the preceding section of this paper, Stagg was decided 
upon a close construction of section 65(2)(b). It is quite clear 
from that case that in holding that 11 allowances
11 included only 
monetary allowances, or those convertible into money, Hutchison 
A.C.J. was not enunciating a principle of general application to 
all forms of income. 
That convertibility is not a prerequisite to all forms of income 
is evident from the decision of the House of Lords in Lady Miller 
v Commissioners of Inland Revenue.
68 There, the House of Lords 
was concerned with whether the occupation of a mansion 
constituted income under Schedule A of the United Kingdom Act. 
That Schedule brought to charge "the property in all lands, 
tenements, hereditaments, and heritages in the United Kingdom, 
for every 20 shillings of the annual value thereof. By rule 1 
67. [1938] 1 All E.R. 428. 
68. (1930) 15 T.C. 25. 
of the rules under the Schedule it was provided that 
11 tax under 
this Schedule shall be charged on and paid by the occupier for 
the time being. If the right to occupy was income, then by 
sections 4 and 5 of the Income Tax Act 1918 the value of that 
right was included within the taxpayer's income for super tax 
purposes. 
In the Scottish Court of Session it was held, relying on Tennant 
v Smith, that the right to occupy was not income as it was not 
convertible into cash.
69 In the House of Lords, however, Tennant 
v Smith was distinguished and the right of occupation was held to 
be income by virtue of the Schedule A charge. Lord Buckmaster 
.d 70 sa, : 
It is impossible to examine the judgments [in Tennant 
v Smith] closely without realising that they were 
based upon the fact that, whatever advantage the agent 
might have enjoyed from his residence, it could not 
possibly be made the subject of assessment under 
Schedules D and E ... To my mind ... this case in no way 
governs the present. 
Therefore, his Lordship expressly limited Tennant v Smith to 
Schedules D and E. Viscount Dunedin and Lord Warrington reached 
the same conclusion, the former commenting that 
11 [t]he Bank 
case ... has, I think, been only misunderstood.
1171 Lord Warrington 
held that Tennant v Smith 11 is no authority in support of the 
Respondent's case, 1172 and overruled the Court of Session's 
decision as follows: 73 
The majority of the Juges in the Court of Session 
appear to have based their conclusion on the view 
that unless the annual value is capable of conversion 
into money either by letting or otherwise, it 
cannot be treated as income of the occupier, and 
further that, in the present case, on the 
construction of the settlement, it was not capable 
of such conversion. Thinking as I do that there is 
no ground in law for their general propositon, I 
do not think it necessary to decide the point on the 
construction of the particular settlement .. 
69. Reported along with the decision of the House of Lords at 
(1930) 15 T.C. 25. 





It could perhaps be argued that Lady Miller's case applies only to 
Schedule A of the United Kingdom Income Tax Act. Prior to 1963 
that Schedule included within the charge to tax the right to 
74 
occupy property. In many cases that right would not be 
convertible into cash. Therefore, it is not surprising that the 
House of Lords held that the right of occupation was assessable 
under Schedule A irrespective of convertibility. But that 
holding, it could be argued, is limited to Schedule A, which 
rendered liable to tax not some form of receipt, as with the 
other schedules, but the right to use an asset. Thus, because of 
the nature of the charge under that Schedule, Schedule A was a 
special case which in no way affected the convertibility 
requirement in relation to other forms of income. However, in 
London County Council v Attorney-General
75 the House of Lords 
made it clear that the Schedules merely provided separate method s 
of assessing various classes of income and that what was brought 
to charge under each Schedule was income in the ordinary sense of 
that word. Lord Macnaghten said:
76 
Income tax, if I may be pardoned for saying so, 
is a tax on income. It is not meant to be a 
tax on anything else. It is one tax, not a 
collection of taxes essentially distinct. There 
is no difference in kind between the duties of 
income tax assessed under Schedule D and those 
assessed under Schedule A or any of the other 
schedules of charge. One man has fixed property, 
another lives by his wits; each contributes 
to the tax if above the prescribed limit. The 
standard of assessment varies according to the 
nature of the source from which taxable income 
is derived. That is all ... In every case the tax 
is a tax on income, whatever may be the standard 
by which the income is measured. It is a tax 
on 1profits or gains' in the case of duties 
chargeable under Schedule A and everything 
coming under that Schedule ... just as much as 
it is in the case of the other schedules of 
charge (emphasis added). 
74. In 1963 the charge on the beneficial occupation of land was 
abolished due to widespread criticism from home owners: 
Simons Taxes (London, Butterworths,1983) Val.A para A4.101. 
75. [1901] A.C.26. 
76. Ibid. 35-36. 
Therefore the right to occupy property was income in the ordinary 
sense of that word. Schedule A did not operate as a deeming 
provision to include within the meaning of income something which 
otherwise would not be so classified. It follows that income in 
its ordinary sense is capable of encompassing items which are not 
convertible into cash and that the convertibility principle 
enunciated in Tennant v Smith may be restricted to the particular 
provisions under consideration in that case. 
The convertibility principle is therefore of limited application. 
In the United Kingdom it applies to Schedule E and there was some 
indication from Lord Watson's judgment in Tennant v Smith that it 
may apply to Schedule D.
77 In New Zealand Stagg has established 
that section 65(2)(b) encompasses only 
11 allowances 11 which are 
convertible into cash. It is doubtful that the convertibility 
principle could be extended any further. It could be argued that 
as it was indicated in Tennant v Smith that the convertibility 
principle applied to Schedule D, which brought to charge 
11 profits 
or gains arising ... from any profession, trade or vocation
11 , it 
also applies to section 65(2)(a) of the Income Tax Act 1976, 
which includes within assessable income 
11 all profits or gains 
derived from any business 11 . However, Lord Watson's holding in 
Tennant v Smith that the expression 
11 profits or gains 11 in 
Schedule D was not wide enough to encompass 
11 a servant's 
residence in his master's house, or a meal or a suit of livery 
supplied by the master 1178 was made by way of obiter dictum. The 
House of Lords in that case were concerned only with the question 
of whether the occupation of premises fell within the Schedule E 
charge. Moreover, Lord MacNagtan 1 s dictum in London City Council 
v Attorney-General that Schedule A applied to 
11 profits or 
gains 1179 and the conclusion reached in Lady Miller's case that 
Schedule A applies to the right to occupy land whether or not 
that right is convertible into cash, together indicate that the 
expression 11 profits or gains 11 is wide enough to encompass items 
which are not convertible into cash. The same conclusion may be 
reached by an analysis of the expression 
11 profits or gains 11 . 
Although the words of a statute must be read in context, it would 
77. [1892] A.C. 250,161. 
78. Idem. 
79. Supra n.76 and accompanying text. 
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appear that, by using both 11 profits
11 and 11 gains 11 in section 
65(2)(a) Parliament was indicating these these words had 
distinct, albeit similar, meanings and that both profits and 
gains should be brought within the charge to tax. In Tennant v 
Smith Lord Watson held that the word "profits" in its ordinary 
acceptation meant 11 something acquired which the acquirer becomes 
possessed of and can dispose of to his advantage - in other words 
money - or that which can be turned to pecuniary account.
1180 
Bearing in mind that 11 profits 11 means things acquired which are in 
cash or convertible into cash, it is necessary to give some 
meaning to 11 gains 11 which is distinct from that of profits.
81 The 
shorter Oxford Dictionary defines 11 gains
11 inter alia, as 
11 increase of possessions, resources, or advantages, consequent on 
some action or event; profit, emolument; opp[osite] to loss.
11 
And in re Riverton Sheep Dip
82 Mayo Jin discussing the meaning 
of 11 gain 11 said that 11 [t]he most appropriate definition to be 
found in a dictionary may be 'increase in resources or business 
advantages resulting from business transactions or dealings. 
11183 
However, this definition would appear to be too wide for the 
purposes of section 65(2)(a) as it would clearly encompass gains 
of a capital nature. Since income tax was first introduced in 
New Zealand in the Land and Income Tax Assessment Act 1891, 
Schedule D of which brought to charge the 
11 profits or gains" from 
any business, the expression 11 profits or gains" in the context of 
the taxation of business profits has been understood to refer 
only to revenue profits or gains. It would now be too late to 
extend the meaning to capital profits or gains.
84 
80. [1892] AC 150,159. 
81. The relevant principle of statutory interpretation is stated 
in Halsbury's Laws of England (4 ed. Butterworths, 
London, 1980) vol 43, Statutes, para 861 as follows: 
It may be presumed that words are not used in 
a statute without a meaning and are not 
tautologous or superfluous, and so effect 
must be given, if possible, to all the words 
used, for the legislature is deemed not to 
waste its words or say anything in vain. 
82. [1943] S.A.S.R.344. 
83. Ibid.347. See also In Re Commonwealth Homes & Investment 
Co.Ltd. [1943] S.A.S.R.211. 
84. Although in Lowe v C.I.R [1981] l N.Z.L.R. 326 the Court of 
Appeal recogmsed that ss.67(4)(e) and 67(4)(f) encompassed 
capital "gains or profits 11 • 
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Bearing in mind the wide meaning of the word profits, and the 
fact that in the context of section 65(2(a) "profits or gains" 
refers to revenue profits or gains, it is difficult to attribute 
any meaning to the word 11 gain 11 that is not already covered by the 
word 11 profit 11 • It is suggested that the only sensible 
construction that can be placed on 11 gains 11 is that it covers 
things of money's worth which come in but are not convertible 
into money. 
It may therefore be concluded that the convertibility princ i ple 
applies only to income from employment. Contrary to the 
decisions in Dawson and Cooke & Sherden, the better view is that 
the principle does not extend to other forms of income. 
4. When is a benefit convertible into cash? 
Although benefits in kind granted to employees are not taxable 
unless in cash or convertible into cash, - at least in the United 
Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand - the courts appear willi ng t o 
hold that non-monetary benefits are convertible into cash. In 
Abbott v Philbin85 the share option in question was 
non-transferable. However, in the House of Lords the majority 
held that it was convertible into cash because the taxpayer could 
have exercised the option and then disposed of the shares for a 
cash consideration. Viscount Simmonds held that the test of 
convertibility is "whether it is something which is, by its 
nature, capable of being turned into money.
1186 And Lord 
Radcliffe said of fringe benefits:
87 
If they are by their nature incapable of being 
turned into money by the recipient they are not 
taxable, even if they are, in the ordinary sense 
of the word, of value to him. 
Therefore, it appears that a benefit is convertible or 
non-convertible according to whether or not by its nature it is 
convertible or non-convertible. Contractual stipulations, as for 
example the stipulation against transfer in Abbott v Philbin, 
85. [1961] A.C.352; supra n.43 and accompanying text. 
86. Ibid. 366. 
87. Ibid. 378. 
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would appear to be irrelevant. However, Lord Radcliffe made it 
clear that the proper test to be applied is by no means settled. 
His Lordship postulated the following questions:
88 
Must the inconvertibility arise from the nature 
of the thing itself, or can it be imposed merely 
by contractual stipulation? Does it matter that 
the circumnstances are such that conversion into 
money is a practical, though not a theoretical, 
impossibility; or the other, that conversion, 
though forbidden, is the most probable assumption? 
If the proper test is whether the benefit in its nature is 
convertible into cash then there would be few inconvertible 
benefits. Motor cars, accommodation, overseas trips and share 
options are all intrinsically capable of being converted into 
cash. In practice, the courts have looked to the terms of the 
contract rather than to the nature of the benefit. Thus, in 
Stagg v IRC89 and FCT v Cooke & Sherden90 the overseas trip and 
the holiday respectively were both items which of their nature 
were convertible into cash but which under the terms of the 
agreements in question were found not to possess that quality. 
However, notwithstanding the fact that the courts look to the 
terms of the contract contractual stipulations as to 
non-transferability will not always preclude a finding of 
convertibility. Thus, although the share options in Abbott v 
Philbin were not able to be transferred they were found to be 
convertible into cash. Similarly, in Heaton v Be11
91 the 
contractual prohibition on assignment of the car did not preclude 







Admittedly he could not assign it and he could 
not get money so long as he kept the right. But 
he could have surrendered the right and if he 
had done so the agreement provided that his wage 
would be increased. So why should he not be taxed 
on the amount of increased wages which he had 
it in his power to get by making that surrender? 
Idem. 
[1959] N.Z.L.R 1252. 




In Heaton v Bell there was provision in the particular agreement 
for the taxpayer to receive a higher wage if he withdrew from the 
car loan scheme. The situation is unclear where there is no such 
provision in the employment contract, or any collateral contract, 
but it is understood that the employee will receive a lower 
salary than would otherwise be the case as a result of accepting 
a fringe benefit and that if he decided to forgo the benefit he 
would receive a higher salary. The better view is that such a 
benefit is convertible as the taxpayer is able to receive a 
higher salary by forgoing the benefit. That the taxpayer doesn't 
actually avail himself of the opportunity to convert the benefit 
is irrelevant. Based on the Heaton v Bell rationale, the ability 
to convert is the operative test. If this view is correct, then 
many of the fringe benefits currently provided will be 
convertible into cash. Company cars, for example, are often 
provided in lieu of a salary in order to reduce the taxpayer's 
liability to tax. In many cases it is likely that if the car was 
not accepted then a higher salary would be payable. In the 
absence of a written agreement, however, there would of course be 
some difficulty in establishing that a higher salary could be 
obtained if a fringe benefit was forgone. 
D. The United States 
l. Background 
In the United States the taxation of fringe benefits is not 
restricted by any requirement of convertibility. As in the other 
jurisdictions surveyed income is defined in section 61(a) of the 
Internal Revenue Code 1954 on a source basis.
93 However, the 
courts in the United States have construed the word "income" in a 
much wider sense than in those other jurisdictions. That wider 
concept of income is not sufficiently broad as to encompass 
unrealised capital gains. However, it is broad enough to bring 
fringe benefits within the charge to tax. 
The wider concept of income adopted in the United States is due 
partly to historical and constitutional factors and partly to 
judicial attitudes to the interpretation of statutes. Both of 
these factors are considered in this section of the paper. 
93. Section 6l(a) includes within the definition of "gross 
income" "income from whatever source". 
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2. Historical and constitutional background. 
By Article 1, section 8, clause 1 of the United States 
Constitution Congress has the power : 
To lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and 
exises, to pay the debts and provide for the 
common defence and general welfare of the 
United States, but all duties, imposts and 
excises shall be uniform throughout the United 
States ... 
However, the taxing power is circumscribed somewhat by section 2 
clause 3 of Article 1 which provides 
Representative and direct taxes shall be 
apportioned among the several States which 
may be included within this Union, according 
to their respective numbers ... ; 
and by section 9 clause 4 of Article 1 : 
No capitation, or other direct, ta x shall be 
laid, unless in proportion to the census or 
enumeration hereinbefore directed to be 
ta ken ... 
Thus, direct taxes, a term undefined in the Const i tution, could 
only be imposed if apportioned among the States according to 
their various populations. 
Until the Civil War customs receipts formed the backbone of the 
federal tax system. However, those receipts proved insufficient 
to enable the North to finance its war effort and in 1846 an 
income tax was introduced. By section 27 of that Act a tax was 
imposed on 
... the annual gains, profits, and income of 
any person ... whether derived from any kind 
of property, rents, interests, dividends, 
or salaries, or from any profession, trade, 
employment, or vocation ... or from any other 
source whatever. 
In Springer v u.s. 94 the constitutionality of that Act was 
upheld. The Supreme Court held that an income tax was an 
indirect tax and was thus not subject to the apportionment 
requirements of the Constitution. Rather, such a tax was 
94. 102 U.S. 586 (1880). 
36 
considered to be more in the nature of an excise or duty. Direct 
taxes were held to include only capitation taxes, where a levy is 
imposed on a per capita basis, and taxes on real estate. 
In 1894 another income tax was imposed along the lines of the 
1846 tax. The constitutionality of the tax on rent from land 
imposed by that Act was challenged in Pollock v Farmer's Loan 
Trust. 95 There, the Supreme Court held that the tax on rents 
from land was in fact a tax on the land itself and as such was 
unconstitutuional unless apportioned. As a substantial part of 
the Act was held to be invalid the Court held that it was invalid 
as a whole. 
Thus, subsequent to Springer and Pollock Congress could have 
imposed a tax on income from wages and salaries as such a tax was 
regarded as being indirect. Furthermore, a tax could have been 
imposed on income from property so long as such a tax was 
apportioned. However, apportionment would have been too 
difficult, and to impose an income tax only on earned income 
would have been politically inexpedient.
96 Therefore, the 
Sixteenth Amendment to the Constitution was promoted and ratified 
removing the requirement that direct taxes be apportioned among 
the States according to population. The Amendment provided 
The Congress shall have power to lay and collect 
taxes on incomes from whatever source derived, without 
apportionment among the several States, and without 
regard to any census or ennumeration. 
3. Income tax and the courts 
The Sixteenth Amendment had been ratified by February 1913 and 
was followed soon after by enactment of the Revenue Act 1913. By 
Part A of that Act a tax was imposed on "the entire net income 
arising or accruing from all sources'' of citizens of the United 
States. By Part B net income was defined as including : 
95. 157 U.S. 429 (1895). 
96. In discussing the background to the Sixteenth Amendment 
Bittker records that: 
While unearned income is only a small fraction of total 
notional income it becomes an increasingly important 
component of individual income as income rises; and 
this meant that taxing earned income but not income 
from investments was not politically acceptable 
(emphasis in the original). 
B.I.Bittker Federal taxation of Income, Estates and 
Gifts (Warren Gorham and Lamont, Boston, 1981) Vol 1, 
chl, pl9. 
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gains, profits, and income derived from salaries, 
wages, or compensation for personal service of 
whatever kind and in whatever form paid, or 
from professions, vocations, businesses, trade, 
commerce, or sales, or dealings in property ... 
It will be seen that as in the other jurisdictions surveyed 
"income" itself was not actually defined but was described as 
being something arising from various sources. It is interesting 
to note that income was expressed to include "profits, gains, and 
income ... in whatever form paid". Payment in kind was therefore 
expressly encompassed within the definition. 
The ambit of the income tax first fell to be considered by the 
Supreme Court in Eisner v Macomber.
97 There, Mr. Justice Pitney, 
delivering the majority judgment, adopted the definition 
enunciated in two cases under the Corporation Tax Act 1908 that 
"income may be defined as the gain derived from capital, from 
labour, or from both combined.
1198 Therefore, as in other 
countries, income was seen essentially as being the yield of a 
productive source. The distinction between income and capital 
was metaphorically described as follows:
99 
The fundamental relation of 'capital' to 'income' 
has been much discussed by economists, the former 
being likened to the tree or the land, the 
latter to the fruit or the crop; the former 
depicted as a resevoir supplied from springs, 
the latter as the outlet stream, to be measured by 
its flow during a period of time. 
However, Mr. Justice Pitney's dictum as to the nature of income 
has been emasculated by subsequent Supreme Court decisions. In 
C.I.R. v SmithlOO the taxpayer was given by way of compensat i on 
for his services an option to purchase shares at their market 
value when the option was granted. The taxpayer exercised the 
option in two later years when the market value of the shares was 
greater than the option price. In the Supreme Court it was held 




252 U.S.189 (1920). 
Stratton's Inde~endence v Howbert 231 U.S. 399, 415, (1913); 
Doyle v Mitchel Bras.Co. 247 U.S. 179,185 (1918). 
252 U.S. 189,206 (1920). The definition of income 
enunciated in Eisner v Macomber has been approved in the 
United Kingdom in IRC v Blott [1921] 2 A.C. 171. 
100. 324 U.S. 177 (1945). 
the option in the amount of the difference between the option 
price and the then market value of the shares. Chief Justice 
Stone, delivering the majority judgment, considered that section 
22 (a) of the 1938 Act
101 11 is broad enough to include in taxable 
income any economic or financial benefit conferred on the 
employee as compensation, whatever the form or mode by which it 
is effected. 11102 This approach is wider than that taken in 
Eisner v Macomber and clearly brings fringe benefits within the 
tax net. 
The Supreme Court reiterated the broad approach to the definition 
of income in C.I.R. v Glenshaw Glass Co. 
103 There, the Court was 
concerned with the assessability of punitive damages received in 
settlement of an antitrust and fraud action. Although the case 
was not concerned with a fringe benefit, the following dictum of 
Chief Justice Warren is of general application :
104 
This Court has frequently stated that this language 
[ie section 22(a)J was used by Congress to exert in this 
field the 'full measure of its taxing power ... ' Congress 
applied no limitations as to the source of taxable 
receipts, nor restrictive labels as to their nature ... 
And the Court has given a liberal construction to this 
broad phraseology in recognition of the intention 
of Congress to tax all gains except those specifically 
exempted. 
Eisner v Macomber was distinguished by the Court as applying only 
to cases where it is necessary to distinguish income from 
capital. Mr. Justice Warren commented that the test in Eisner v 
Macowber 11 was not meant to provide a touchstone to all future 
. t· 11105 gross income ques ,ons. 
101. Section 22(a) of the Inland Revenue Code 1939 provided: 
'Gross income' includes gains, profits, and income 
derived from salaries, wages, or compensation for 
personal service ... of whatever form paid, or from 
professions, vocations, trades, businesses, 
commerce or sales, or dealings in property, 
whether real or personal, growing out of the 
ownership or use of or interest in such property 
... or gains or profits and income derived from 
any source whatever. 
In the Inland Revenue Code 1954 section 6l(a), which 
replaces section 22(a) provides: 
'Gross income' includes all income from whatever 
source derived. 
102. 324 U.S. 177,181 (1945). 
103. 348 U.S. 426 (1955). 
104. Ibid. 429-430. 
105. Ibid. 430. 
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In Glenshaw Glass the Court held that although the definition of 
"gross income"contained in the 1954 Code differed considerably 
from that in the 1938 Code, the wide concept of income fonnulated 
in Smith, based as it was on section 22(a) of the 1938 Code, 
applied with equal force to section 6l(a) of the 1954 Code.
106 
That concept is clearly wide enough to encompass fringe benefits, 
as Smith itself illustrates. Further illustration is provided by 
107 Rudolph v U.S. There, the Commissioner assessed an insurance 
agent on the value of an employer-paid trip for the taxpayer and 
his wife to New York. The trip, ostensibly for a business 
convention, took one week in total and of the two and a half days 
spent in New York only one morning was devoted to business. The 
Supreme Court, applying the test laid down in Smith that section 
6l(a) included as income any economic or financial benefit 
conferred on an employee as compensation, upheld the 
Commissioner's assessment. As the trip was predominantly for 
recreational purposes it was considered that its value 
represented a financial benefit to the taxpayer. 
Thus, the distinction enunciated in Tennant v Smith between that 
which comes into the pocket and that which saves the pocket from 
expenditure is not recognised in the tax jurisprudence of the 
United States. Accordingly, whether or not a benefit in kind is 
convertible into cash is irrelevant. The overriding test is 
whether the benefit confers on the taxpayer an economic or 
financial gain of some form. At the same time, the courts do not 
go so far as to approve the concept of income as understood by 
economists. 108 As was stated by Mr Justice Holmes in Weiss v 
106. Supra n.99 for the texts of ss.22(a) and 6l(a). That the 
wide concept applies to s.6l(a) was also recognised in U.S. 
v Gotcher 401 F.2d 118 (1968) where Mr Justice Thornberry 
said 
The concept of economic gain to the taxpayer is the 
key to section 61 ... this concept contains two 
distinct requirements : There must be an economic 
gain, and this gain must benefit the taxpayer 
personally. In some cases, as in the case of an 
expense-paid trip, there is no direct gain, but 
there is an indirect economic gain inasmuch as 
a benefit has been received without a corresponding 
diminution in wealth. 
107. 370 U.S. 269 (1962). 
108. For a discussion of economic concepts of income see 
supra Pt II, B,l "Income in the economic sense". 
109. 279 U.S. 333 (1979). 
Wiener: 11 The income tax laws do not profess to embody perfect 
economic theory. 11110 If income tax laws do not embody economic 
theory, then it is not surprising that judicial pronouncements 
on the meaning of income also fail to embody such theory. 
4. The United States and the Commonwealth jurisdictions 
compared. 
The wider concept of income in the United States, and hence the 
assessability of fringe benefits according to ordinary concepts 
of income rather than by specific statutory provision, is 
attributable both to the statutory definition of income and to 
the manner in which that definition has been interpreted in the 
courts. Although as in the Commonwealth countries surveyed in 
this paper income is defined in the United States on a source 
basis, the statutory definition in the United States is couched 
in more general terms. Thus, the courts have been willing to 
hold that income includes all forms of economic or financial 
benefit. In the United Kingdom, on the other ha nd, income is 
more specifically defined. As a result the cases turn more on a 
close analysis of the statutory language than on general 
principles. The same is true of the New Zealand legislation. 
More important, however, is the different judicial attitudes to 
the interpretation of statutes. In the Commonwealth countries 
taxing statutes in particular are narrowly construed, the classic 
statement being made in Tennant v Smith that "in a taxing Act it 
is impossible ... to assume any intention" so the court must 
determine "whether a tax is expressly imposed.
11111 In the United 
States, on the other hand, the approach is markedly different. 
110. Ibid. 335. 
111. [1892] AC 150, 154. This approach was recently reiterated 
in New Zealand in Lowe v CIR [1981] l N.Z.L.R. 326, 342 
where Richardson J approvedof Rowlatt J's statement 
in The Cape Brandy Syndicate v Commissioners of Inland 
Revenue [1921] 1 K.B.64, 71 : 
... in taxation you have to look simply at what 
is clearly said. There is no room for any 
indendment; there is no equity about a tax: 
there is no presumption as to a tax, you read 
nothing in, you imply nothing, but you look 
fairly at what is said and at what is said 
clearly and that is the tax. 
41 
There, the courts are prepared to ascertain the intention of 
Congress by reference to the reports of debates in the House of 
Representatives and to apply that intention to the statutory 
provision under consideration. 
112 This is well illustrated in 
Glenshaw Glass where by reference to reports of the proceedings 
in Congress, the Court held that the broader wording of the 
definition of gross income in the 1954 Code as contrasted with 
the 1938 Code did not alter the meaning of the definition.
113 
Similarly, in Pollock the meaning of 11 direct 11 tax in Article 1 of 
the Constitution was determined in large part by reference to the 
debates preceding the ratification of the Constitution in 1789. 
Thus, the stricture in Tennant v Smith against assuming any 
intention in a taxing Act has no counterpart in the United 
States. Rather, the Courts there adopt a purposive approach. In 
Smith and Glenshaw Glass, for example, section 22(a) of the 1938 
Code was interpreted on the basis that Congress in enacting that 
provision intended to exert "the full measure of its taxing 
power. 11114 
It is also noteworthy that in the United States the courts are 
more willing to distinguish earlier decisions and limit their 
application to specific factual situations. Thus, in Glenshaw 
Glass the test enunciated in Eisner v Macomber as to the nature 
of income was limited largely to the factual situation then 
before the Court although a reading of the case indicates that 
the test was intended to be of general application. In the 
Commonwealth jurisdictions, however, the courts are more 
reluctant to adopt this approach. Thus, the test as to 
convertibility laid down in Tennant v Smith remains in force even 
though it was recognised by Lord Diplock in Heaton v Bell to be 
no longer in keeping with ordinary concepts of income. 
112. The broad approach preferred by the courts in the United 
States is illustrated in the following comments of Mr. 
Justice Holmes in Johnson v U.S. 163 F 30,32 (1908): 
The legislature has the power to decide what the 
policy of the law shall be, and if it has 
intimated its will, however indirectly, that 
will should be recognised and obeyed. The 
major premise of the conclusion expressed in 
a statute, the change of policy that induces 
the enactment, may not be set out in terms, 
but it is not an adequate discharge of duty 
for the courts to say: We see what you are 
driving at, but you have not said it, and 
therefore we shall go on as before. 
113. 348 U.S. 426, 432 (1955). 
114. Ibid. 429. 
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III ANTI-AVOIDANCE MEASURES 
A. Preamble. 
Part II of this paper was concerned with establishing that fringe 
benefits generally fall outside the tax net, and with analysing 
the reasons for that exclusion. In this part of the paper 
consideration is given to the measures adopted in the 
jurisdictions surveyed to ensure that fringe benefits are brought 
within the tax net. First, the problems associated with any 
attempt to tax fringe benefits will be highlighted. Secondly, 
the tax regimes adopted to counteract tax avoidance by the 
provision of fringe benefits will be discussed. Thirdly, 
consideration will be given to general anti-avoidance provisions 
which seek to bring all fringe benefits within the charge to tax. 
And finally, as in Part II of the paper, the tax treatment of 
fringe benefits in the United States will be considered 
separately. 
B. Problems Associated with Taxing Fringe Benefits. 
1. Identification. 
In seeking to tax fringe benefits the benefits upon which tax is 
to be levied must first be identified. In some cases it may be 
difficult to distinguish between conditions of work and fringe 
benefits. That difficulty could be resolved by listing certain 
items which, if provided by the taxpayer's employer, are to be 
treated as fringe benefits in all cases and taxed accordingly. 
However, that approach would be intrinsically unfair as the 
following extract from King & Kaye's book on the British tax 
t . d. t 115 sys em ,n ,ea es : 
It is difficult to determine any sensible borderline 
between conditions of work and benefits. The employer 
who provides a congenial washroom for his employees is 
presumably simply offering a reasonable working environ-
ment, while the one who installs a coloured suite in the 
bathroom of their homes is providing a fringe benefit; 
but there is a spectrum of benefits in between ... 
115. King and Kaye The British Tax System (Oxford University 
Press, 1979) p.41. 
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Thus, a blanket taxation of all employer-provided washrooms would 
prove unfair to those for whom the facility was provided in order 
to make their working environment more pleasant. The same 
applies with the more common forms of fringe benefit. Blanket 
taxation of all employer-provided cars, for example, would prove 
unfair to those for whom the car was a condition of employment. 
Travelling salesmen and employee taxi drivers would suffer under 
any such tax. Clearly, then, if particular benefits are to be 
singled out for tax treatment rules need to be formulated to 
ensure that only benefits conferring some form of financial 
benefit attract the operation of the taxing provisions. 
Assuming that particular benefits are to be singled out for tax 
purposes, questions arise as to which benefits should be chosen. 
Should employer-subsidised meals and creches be taxed? Should 
free newspapers and car parking facilities be taxed? Or would 
the time spent on administering a tax imposed on such items make 
the tax uneconomic? 
In practice the problem of identification is dealt with by taxing 
certain specific benefits and then providing a general sweeping 
up clause which catches all "other benefits of any kind 
whatever 11116 or 11 other benefits and facilities of whatsoever 
nature. 11117 The specific benefits are generally those likely to 
generate the most revenue: motor cars, accommodation, low 
interest loans and share options being common examples. The 
effects of the general sweeping up provision is to confer on the 
revenue authorities of the country concerned a discretion as to 
which benefits should be selected for tax treatment. Thus, 
although free newspapers may fall within the statutory language 
the revenue authority may, for the purposes of administrative 
efficacy, treat them as being non-taxable. At the same time, 
however, more valuable benefits, such as overseas trips and the 
payment of school fees, which also fall within the terms of the 
sweeping-up clause, may be treated as taxable. 
The problems associated with general sweeping-up provisions, or 
more aptly general anti-avoidance provisions, will be discussed 
116. Section 6(1)(a), Income Tax Act 1970 (Canada). 
117. Section 61(1), Finance Act 1976 (United Kingdom). 
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later in the paper. Suffice it to say for present purposes that 
from the point of view of those charged with administering the 
tax system such provisions, if liberally interpreted by the 
courts, resolve any difficulties in identifying the benefits to 
be taxed. The de facto discretionary power which they confer 
allows the authority to select for tax treatment the benefits 
which will generate the most revenue and which will be easier to 
administer. 
2. Valuation. 
The major difficulty in taxing fringe benefits lies in valuing 
them for tax purposes. In many cases fringe benefits perform a 
dual function. Thus, low interest loans to bank employees serve 
not only to provide the employee with a benefit but also to 
provide the bank with long-term employees. Similarly, benefits 
may be provided with strings attached, so that an executive 
provided with free accommodation, for example, may be required 
to use that accommodation to entertain company clients. In other 
situations, the benefit provided may entail a restriction of 
choice so an employee provided with a Ford motor car if left to 
his own choice may have preferred a Toyota. In other cases, the 
benefit provided may be more extravagant than the employee would 
himself have provided. Thus, a host of subjective factors affect 
the value of the benefit to the taxpayer. Whether these 
subjective factors should be taken into account in valuing the 
fringe benefit, and if so to what extent, are problems which 
confront any Legislature seeking to tax fringe benefits. 
As an alternative to value to the employee fringe benefits could 
be taxed according to their cost to the employer. Therefore, if 
a car cost the taxpayer's employer $20,000 the value of the 
taxable benefit to the employee could be expressed as a 
percentage of that cost. The major objection to that approach is 
that it may operate arbitrarily. Suppose, for example, that two 
employees, Fagin and Sykes, are provided with a car by their 
respective employers. Fagin, an executive with a large publicly 
listed company, has unrestricted use of the car provided by the 
company. On the other hand Sykes, a public servant, is unable to 
use the car provided for his use for private purposes during 
weekends. Clearly, in that situation, any calculation of the 
taxable value of the benefit solely by reference to the cost to 
the employer would work unfairly in Fagin's favour to the 
detriment of Sykes. 
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Where benefits are provided at little or no cost to the employer 
it will be impractical or impossible to adopt cost to the 
employer as the basis of valuation. Thus, it would not be 
practical to value the benefit conferred on airline employees 
allowed to fill vacant seats on flights run by the airline on the 
basis of the cost to the employer providing that benefit. 
Similarly, where a newspaper company provides free newspapers for 
its employees, or where a retailer gives produce to his employees 
which otherwise would deteriorate, the value of the benefit 
conferred could not be measured by reference to the cost to the 
employer of providing the benefit. 
As a third option, the market value could provide the basis of 
valuation. Thus, rent free accommodation could be valued 
according to the prevailing market rentals in the area in which 
the accommodation is situated. As with cost to the employer, 
market value could be unfair to the taxpayer in some 
circumstances. A New Zealand diplomat stationed in Tokyo or 
Washington, for example, could be faced with a large tax bill if 
assessed on the market value of his accommodation. 
In practice fringe benefits are valued according to all three 
methods. In Australia, for example, fringe benefits are valued 
according to their value to the taxpayer. Thus, in relation to 
rent free or low rental accommodation sections 26AAAA and 26AAAB 
of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 contain detailed provisions 
calculated to ensure that the taxpayer is taxed upon the value to 
him of the accommodation benefit rather than upon some objective 
basis. On the other hand, in the United Kingdom the value of 
fringe benefits is determined by a mixture of cost to the 
employer, market value and value to the taxpayer. 
C. The Scheme of Anti-Avoidance Legislation. 
l. New Zealand. 
The tax regime governing fringe benefits in New Zealand follows 
closely the pattern to be found in other jurisdictions. Section 
65(2)(b) of the Income Tax Act 1976 is a general anti-avoidance 
provision which includes within assessable income all "allowances 
(whether in cash or otherwise)". Specific provision is then made 
46 
in section 69 for benefits conferred under share option or share 
purchase schemes and under section 72 for benefits provided by 
way of board, lodging or house allowances. 
Prima facie section 65(2)(b) is wide enough to encompass any fonn 
of non-monetary benefit. However, its effect in relation to such 
benefits has been rendered nugatory by the courts. In Stagg v 
I.R.c. 118 the expression "allowances (whether in cash or 
otherwise)" was held to apply only to cash allowances or to 
allowances which are convertible into cash. And in C.I.R. v 
Parson 119 "allowances" was strictly construed so as to apply only 
to items which were regarded as being allowances in 1900. 
Therefore, unless specific provision is made fringe benefits may 
be regarded as being non-taxable in New Zealand. 
2. Australia. 
Provision for the taxation of fringe benefits has been made in 
the Australian legislation since the federal income tax was first 
introduced in 1915. By section 14(g) of the Income Tax 
Assessment Act 1915 assessable income was deemed to include "all 
allowances ... whether in money or goods or sustenance or land ... to 
the amount of the value of such allowances." The present 
legislation contains a similar, although wider, provision. By 
section 26(e) of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 assessable 
income includes: 
[T]he value to the taxpayer of all allowances, 
benefits, bonuses and premiums allowed, given or 
granted to him in respect of, or for or in 
relation directly or indirectly to, any 
employment of or services rendered by him, 
whether so allowed, given or granted in money, 
goods, land, meals, sustenance, the use of 
premises or quarters or otherwise. 
Section 26(e) is complemented by section 26AAC which provides a 
basis for the valuation of benefits provided by way of share 
purchase or share option schemes, and by sections 26AAAA and 
26AAAB which make provision for the valuation of employee 
h . 120 ousing. 
118. Supra. n.48 and accompanying text. 
119. [1968] N.Z.L.R. 574; considered later in the paper. 
120. Sections 26 AAAA and 26AAAB 
of this paper. 
are considered in Part IV 
It will be seen that as in New Zealand, the Australian 
legislation does not contain a comprehensive scheme for the 
taxation of fringe benefits. Although section 26(e) is wide 
enough to encompass all fringe benefits, in practice it is 
limited to the specific benefits mentioned therein. Thus, fringe 
benefits in the form of 11 land, meals, sustenance, the use of 
premises or quarters 11 are taxed, while some of the more common 
forms of benefit, such as cars and low interest loans, escape the 
tax net. 
3. Canada. 
Compared with Australia and New Zealand Canada has a 
comprehensive fringe benefit tax regime. The general taxing 
provision is contained within section 6(1)(a) of the Income Tax 
Act 1972 which includes within 11 income from an office or 
employment: 11 
the value of board, lodging and other benefits 
of any kind whatever received or enjoyed by him 
in the year in respect of, in the course of, 
or by virtue of an office or employment ... 
In addition specific provision is made for the taxation of motor 
cars, 121 low interest loans,
122 and share purchase and share 
t . h 123 op ,on sc emes. 
4. United Kingdom 
Of the countries surveyed the United Kingdom has enacted the most 
complete regime for the taxation of fringe benefits. This is due 
in part to the decision in Tennant v Smith
124 that Schedule E 
encompasses only perquisites that are convertible into cash, and 
125 
in part to the decision in Hochstrasser v Mayes that Schedule 
121. Section 6(l)(e) Income Tax Act R.S.C.1970. 
122. Section 80.4 Income Tax Act R.S.C. 1970. 
123. Section 7 Income Tax Act R.S.C.1970. 
124. [1892] A.C. 150. 
125. [1960] A.C. 376. 
E brings to charge only benefits of which the employment is the 
causa causans 126 and not those of which the employment is the 
causa sine qua non. 127 Combined with the high personal tax rates 
enjoyed in the United Kingdom for many years the ineffectiveness 
of Schedule E in relation to fringe benefits encouraged the 
Legislature to enact a comprehensive regime to prevent tax 
avoidance by the granting of fringe benefits. 
The provisions governing the taxation of fringe benefits are 
divisible into two categories : those that apply to all 
taxpayers; and those which apply only to higher paid employees 
and directors. For the sake of convenience the scheme of the 
legislation is set out in Table 1. 
126. Defined in Black 1 s Law Dictionary (5 ed., West Publishing 
Co. Minnesota, 1979) as 11 The immediate cause; the last 
link in the chain of causation. 11 
127. Defined in Black 1 s Law Dictionar{ (Idem) as 11 A cause without 
which the effect in question wou d not have happened ... A 
cause without which the thing cannot be. 11 
Table 1.: Legislation governing the taxation of fringe 
benefits in the United Kingdom. 
A. Benefits taxable to all employees 
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1. Perquisites. 2.Accommodation 3.Vouchers & 4. Share Purchases 
Schedule E Income 
Tru-. Act 1970: 
taxess all emolu-
ments, which are 
defined in s.183 
including "per-
quisites". Of limited 
effect in relation 
to fringe benefits 
due to Tennant v 
Su:i th and 
Hochstrasser v 
Moyes 
Sections 33 & 33A, 
Finance Act 1977: 
(a) Section 33 
provides that the 
taxpayer is taxed 
on the annual value 
of employer-provided 
accommodation. 
(b) Section 33A 
imposes a special 
charge in addition to 
s.33 where the cost 
of the accommodation 
was more than £75,000 
Credit Tokens 
Sections 36 & 36A 
Finance Act 1975: 
(a) Section 36 
provides that the 
employee is taxed 
on the cost of any 
voucher provided by 
his employer. 
(b) Section 36A 
makes similar 
provision in 
relation to credit 
tokens 
and options 
Sections 186 Income 
Taxes Act 1970; 77 
& 79 Finance Act 
1972, and 47 
Finance Act 1980. 
B. Benefits Taxable only to higher paid employees and directors. 
5. Benefits 
Section 61 Finance 
Finance Act 1976: 
Brings to charge 
all "benefits", 
defined in s.61(3) 
as accommodation 
other than living 
accommodation, 
entertainment, 
domestic or other 




6,Cars & Car Fuel 
Sections 64 & 64A 
Finance Act 1976: 
(a) s.64 brings to 
charge the 'cash 
equivalent' of the 
benefit derived 
from the car 
(b) s.64A brings 
to charge the 
'cash' equivalent' 
of employer 
provided fuel for 
the car. 
Section 62A Finance Act 1976: 
Ensures that scholarships provided 
for a member of the taxpayer's 
fa.!!'ily are included within the 
taxpayer's taxable income. 
7. Accommodation 8. Low Interest 
loans 
Section 63A Finance Section 66 Finance 
Act 1976: Act 1976: Provides 
Provides that that the 'cash 
amounts reimbursed equivalent' of any 
on heating,lighting,low interest loans 
cleaning, repairs, is included within 
maintenance and 





Due to the two-tier system those who are directors or are engaged 
in higher paid employment are at a distinct disadvantage. Not 
only are they taxed on certain benefits which are taxable to all 
taxpayers, but they are also singled out for special treatment in 
relation to several other benefits. Furthermore, although the 
distinction between higher paid employees and other may be 
considered justified on the grounds that the higher paid are more 
likely to receive fringe benefits than are those in lower income 
brackets, section 69(1) of the Finance Act 1976 defines 
11 higher 
paid employment 11 as meaning employment with emoluments off 8,500 
per annum or above. This, the "higher paid employment" 
provisions apply not only to those who would normally be regarded 
as high income earners but also to those in the middle income 
bracket. Moreover, by section 69(2) emoluments are calculated by 
including all amounts brought to charge under the Finance Act 
1976. Therefore, it would not be possible to avoid 
categorisation as a higher paid employee by providing, for 
example, a salary of~S,499 per annum along with a low interest 
loan and the use of a company car. Both the benefits provided 
and the salary paid are taken into account in calculating whether 
thef-8,500 limit has been exceeded. 
D. General Anti-Avoidance Legislation. 
1. Background. 
From the discussion in the preceding section of this part of the 
paper it is evident that the scheme of anti-avoidance legislation 
aimed at fringe benefits is in many respects similar. Although 
the anti-avoidance legislation in Canada and the United Kingdom 
may be more all-embracing than in New Zealand and Australia, the 
basic scheme - whereby specific provision is made for several 
benefits and a general provision is aimed at others - is the 
same. In this section of paper the effectiveness of the general 
anti-avoidance provisions is considered: first, by reference to 
the manner in which such provisions have been interpreted by the 
courts; and secondly by reference to certain problems associated 
with such provisions. 
2. The courts' approach to general anti-avoidance provisions. 
a. New Zealand. 
5:i. 
Section 65(2)(b) of the New Zealand Act includes within 
assessable income : 
All salaries, wages or allowances (whether in cash 
or otherwise), including all sums received or 
receivable by way of bonus, gratuity, extra salary 
or emolument of any kind, in respect or in 
relation to the employment or service of the 
taxpayer: 
The meaning of the word 11 allowances
11 in that prov1s1on was 
128 
considered by the Court of Appeal in C.I.R. v Parson. There, 
the Court were concerned with the assessability of amounts 
derived on the exercise of an option to purchase shares. In the 
relevant income year the taxpayer had exercised an option to 
purchase 1500 shares in his employer company, Woolworths Ltd. At 
the time the option was exercised the market value of 1500 shares 
was£ 1008, however the taxpayer paid only:f-600. The difference 
of i-408 was considered by the Commissioner to be an 
11 allowance 11 
within the terms of section 65(2)(b)
129 and an assessment was 
issued on that basis. 
In the Court of Appeal the majority, comprising North P. and 
McCarthy J., rejected the Commissioner's argument that the sum in 
question was an 11 allowance 11 • Based on an historical analysis of 
section 65(2)(b) their Honours formulated a very limited test as 
to what constitutes an 11 allowance
11
• North P. outlined the 
history of the provision and considered the effect of that 
history as follows :
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I have examined the history of the legislation 
since the enactment of the Land and Income Tax Act 
1891. In that year the words 'including all sums 
received or receivable by way of bonus ... ' did not 
appear. They first appeared in the Land and 
Income Tax Assessment Act 1900 and have been carried 
forward in each succeeding Act with slight 
amendments in language. Section [65(2)(b)], in its 
present form, first appeared in the Land and Income 
Tax Act 1916 (s.85). If [s.65(2)(b)] had stopped at 
the words 'all salaries, wages or allowances 
(whether in cash or otherwise), ... in respect of or 
in relation to the employment or service of the 
taxpayer', it may possibly have been arguable 
that the word 'allowances' was wide enough to 
include all benefits whether in cash or 
otherwise ... 
128. [1968] N.Z.L.R. 574. 
129. In Parson the relevant prov1s1on was s.88(l)(b) of the Land 
and Income Tax Act 1954. However, as that provision is 
identical to s.65(2)(b) of the present Act reference is 
made to s65(2)(b) in the present context. 
130. [1968] N.Z.L.R. 574, 585. 
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However, as Parliament had added the words "including all sums 
received or receivable by way of bonus, gratuity, extra salary, 
or emolument of any kind" North P. considered that "allowances" 
must be construed narrowly. Applying the principle enunciated in 
Dilworth v Commissioner of Stamps
131 that the word "include" is 
generally used in interpretation clauses to enlarge the meaning 
of words or phrases, the learned Judge concluded that by adding 
the words after "including" "[Parliament] has recognised that the 
first mentioned words [i.e. salaries, wages or allowances] in the 
natural import did not include any of these benefits
11132 . 
Accordingly, as Parliament had recognised that the expression 
11 salaries, wages or allowances" had a limited meaning North P. 
was not prepared to give it a wide construction so as to include 
within its ambit a benefit derived on the exercise of a share 
option. 
Although it is clear from North P1 s judgment that the word 
"allowances" must be narrowly construed, it is not clear what 
forms of non-monetary benefit, if any, his Honour considered that 
the word encompassed. Some assistance in that regard may be 
garnered from McCarthy J 1 s judgment. As with North P, McCarthy J 
based his judgment on an historical analysis ?3 3 
In my view the word 'allowances' in its original 
context in Schedule E to the 1891 Act had a narrow 
meaning and was intended to apply only to the then 
commonly recognised forms of allowances, such as 
a house allowance, and that it was because 
Parliament recognised the limitations of the word 
that it found it necessary in 1900 to add 'including 
all sums received or receivable by way of bonus, extra 
salary or emolument of any kind'. That was a plain 
example of extending a meaning. No one, I imagine, 
would have contended in 1900 that the word had 
been enlarged sufficiently to include all benefits 
even those not received in the form of money ... 
Basically, the language has not changed since 1900, 
and I feel unable in these circumstances now to 
construe it as covering something which though it 
probably is an emolument, is not received in a 
sum of money. 
It follows logically from McCarthy J's reasoning that the only 
non-monetary allowances caught by section 65(2)(b) are those 
which were regarded as being allowances in 1900 when the words 
131. [1899] A.C. 99. P.C. 
132. [1968] N.Z.L.R. 574, 587. 
133. Ibid. 589. ClW [1!Rll\T 
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succeeding "including" were introduced into the section. This 
conclusion follows from His Honour's comments that prior to the 
enactment of the 1900 Act "allowances" applied only to the then 
recognised forms of allowances; that the limited meaning of 
"allowances" was recognised by Parliament in 1900 when its 
meaning was extended to include "sums received or receivable by 
way of bonus, extra salary, or emolument of any kind"; and that 
as the language of the section had not significantly changed 
since 1900 it could not now be construed in a wider sense. 
Thus "allowances" means things which were regarded as being 
allowances in 1900 and "sums received or receivable by way of 
bonus, extra salary or emolument of any kind." If this 
conclusion is correct then section 65(2)(b) must be regarded as 
being ineffective as against fringe benefits. It has been 
suggested that the only non-cash allowances being provided in 
1900 were housing and accommodation, board and meals, and travel 
and work clothing. 134 
By contrast, Haslam J., in a dissenting judgment, concentrated on 
an analysis of the statutory language of section 65(2)(b) rather 
than on its historical background. The learned Judge considered 
that in the context of the phrase "salaries, wages or allowances 
(whether in cash or otherwise)" the word "allowance" was wide 
enough "to embrace a rent free house for an employee, or by way 
only of further example, a special discount on the firm's goods 
given to staff members by virtue of their employment.
135 , and 
that it was "inherently capable of a general application.
11136 As 
for the effect of the words II i nc 1 udi ng a 11 sums received or 
receivable by way of bonus, gratuity, extra salary, or emolument 
of any kind" his Honour held that as the word "allowances" in its 
natural import already covered such payments their express 
mention could not be read so as to limit the meaning of 
"allowances." Rather, such payments were given separate 
expression "solely for the purposes of clarity and of 
emphasis 11 . 137 Support for this conclusion may be derived from 
134. Richardson & Congreve, supra n.8, p.19. 
135. [1968] N.Z.L.R. 574, 592. 
136. Idem. 
137. Ibid. 593. 
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Wakefield Local Board of Health v West Riding and Grimsby Railway 
Co. 138 where it was held that statutory definitions not adding 
anything to the ordinary meaning of a particular word should be 
treated as having been inserted in an abundance of caution, and 
should not be taken as limiting the meaning of the word defined. 
If Haslam J is correct, and "allowances" does in its usual sense 
include the sums referred to expressly in section 65(2)(b), then 
based on the Wakefield Local Board of Health case the expressly 
mentioned words could in no way limit the meaning of 
11 allowances 11 • Therefore, 11 allowances
11 should be interpreted 
solely in the context of 11 salaries, wages or allowances (whether 
in cash or otherwise) 11 rather than in the more limited context 
suggested by North P. and McCarthy J. Read in that context 
"allowances" is wide enough to include non-cash allowances of any 
type. 
With respect, it is submitted that Haslam J is correct. The sums 
mentioned in the second part of section 65(2(b) add nothing to 
the ordinary meaning of 11 allowances 1
1
• Therefore, reading 
11 allowances 11 in the context of 11 salaries, wages or allowances 
(whether in cash or otherwise)" it is clearly wide enough to 
encompass non-monetary allowances or benefits. It must be 
conceded that the learned Judge gave little weight to the 
legislative history of section 65(2)(b), in particular to the 
alterations made in 1900. However, an analysis of that history 
shows that his Honour was correct in taking that approach. 
Schedule E of the Land and Income Assessment Act 1891 provided 
that every person was liable to tax in respect of income derived 
from employment or emolument. "Income from employment or 
emolument" was defined as meaning : 
the gains or profits derived or received ... from 
the exercise of any profession, employment or 
vocation of any kind not otherwise liable to 
taxation under this Act, or from any salary, 
wa es, allowances, ension, sti end or char e 
or annuity o any in ... emp asis a~ded 
Schedule F contained a number of miscellaneous rules relating to 
assessments. Rule 5 provided 
138. (1865) L.R. 1 Q.B. 84. 
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Allowances made to any person by way of house-rent, 
and all amounts received or receivable by way of 
extra salary, bonus allowance, or emolument shall 
be taken into account as part of the annual 
income liable to taxation (emphasis added). 
It will be seen from the italicised parts of Schedule E and rule 
5 of Schedule F that those provisions contained the basic 
ingredients of section 65(2)(b) as it stands today. In 1900 the 
1891 Act was repealed and replaced by the Land and Income 
Assessment Act 1900. The major feature of the new Act was the 
replacement of the schedular system and the incorporation of the 
charging provisions previously contained in schedules into 
sections contained in the body of the Act. Section 58 of the 
1900 Act provided inter alia that tax was to be levied on 11 income 
derived from employment or emolument 11 • That expression was 
defined in section 60(2) as meaning the profits derived from: 
... any salary, wages, allowances, stipend or pension 
(other than a pension hereinbefore exempt from tax) 
including all sums received or receivable by way of 
bonus, extra salary, or emolument of any kind. 
It is appa rent from the language of section 60(2) that that 
provision represents a consolidation of the italicised parts of 
Schedule E and rule 5 of Schedule F; a consolidation that was 
rendered necessary by the abolition of the schedular system 
contained in the 1891 Act. The sums described in the second part 
of the paragraph were therefore included not, as North P. 
suggested, because Parliament recognised that "salaries, wages or 
allowances" did not include those sums,
139 but rather in an 
excess of caution or, as Haslam J suggests, "for the purpose of 
clarity and of emphasis. 11140 Leaving aside Parliamentary intent, 
the most plausible explanation is that the draftsman of the 1900 
Act was concerned to ensure that the Act he was drafting did not 
exclude from the charge to tax anything that was taxed under the 
1891 Act. To effect that objective, the draftsman simply 
combined, virtually verbatim, the parts of Schedule E and rule 5 
of Schedule F relating to income from employment. Of course, 
speculation as to the intent of statutory draftsmen is of no 
assistance in the interpretation of a statutory provision. 
139. Supra n.132. 
140. Supra n.137. 
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However, in relation to section 60(2) of the 1900 Act, such 
speculation is in any event unnecessary as it is evident from the 
provision itself that the sums mentioned in the second part of 
the paragraph were included merely in an abundance of caution. 
The history of section 65(2)(b) therefore supports the approach 
adopted by Haslam J. rather than that adopted by the majority. 
Support for his Honour's approach may also be derived from the 
fact that by analysing only the language of section 65(2)(b) 
effect could be given to the words "(whether in cash or 
otherwise)" which were inserted in 1916. The approach adopted by 
the majority, on the other hand, virtually rendered those words 
meaningless. 
For practical purposes, it is of little significance that North 
P. and McCarthy J. may have incorrectly construed section 
65(2)(b). As Haslam J. was in the minority his judgment is of 
academic interest only. 
It follows from Parson that if a particular fringe benefit is not 
an "allowance" within the limited meaning given to that term it 
is immaterial whether or not that benefit is convertible into 
cash. Therefore, the correct approach in determining whether a 
fringe benefit is deemed to be assessable income by section 
65(2)(b) is first, to ascertain whether it is an "allowance'' 
within the terms of the Parson rationale, and secondly, having 
ascertained that it is an "allowance" to determine whether or not 
it is convertible into cash. That approach was approved by 
Wallace J. in Sixton v C.I.R. 
141 There, the question falling for 
determination was whether a prize received by an employee under 
an incentive scheme in the form of a non-transferable points 
cheque, and which was subsequently converted into a supertub, was 
an allowance within the terms of section 65(2(b). 
The Commissioner sought to distinguish Parson on its facts, 
arguing that in that case the benefit was unrelated to the 
services being performed while in the case of the prize granted 
141. (1982) 5 T.R.N.Z. 844. 
142. Ibid. 846. 
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to Sixton the benefit was so related and accordingly must be 
regarded as an allowance. However, Wallace J. rejected that 
argument. His Honour held that Parson was indistinguishable: 
first, on the grounds that the facts in Parson and Sixton were 
similar as both related to benefits provided as part of an 
incentive scheme; and secondly on the grounds that in Parson the 
Court of Appeal regarded the question before them as one of 
principle turning upon a correct construction of section 
65(2)(b). And as Parson had been decided on the basis of 
principle, and not merely on the facts of the particular case, 
Wallace J. felt constrained to apply the reasoning adopted by 
North P. and McCarthy J. From North P. 1 s judgment Wallace J. 
derived the proposition that 11 a non-monetary perquisite or 
emolument is not included in the word 1 allowances' 11 ,
142 and from 
McCarthy J's judgment that "non-monetary benefits caught by the 
term 'allowances' are limited to those existing in 1900.
11143 
Applying those principles the learned judge held that the points 
cheque was not an allowance within the terms of section 65(2)(b). 
On the question of convertibility, Wallace J. accepted the 
submission made on behalf of the taxpayer that convertibility was 
irrelevant to any determination of whether the benefit in 
question was an allowance and that it became relevant only once 
it had been established that the benefit was an allowance. 
Having decided that the points cheque was not an allowance his 
Honour felt it unnecessary to consider whether or not the cheque 
was convertible into cash. 
The combined effect of Stagg, Parson and Sixton is to render 
section 65(2)(b) ineffective as against fringe benefits. 
However, it would be possible to by-pass that provision by 
arguing that fringe benefits are income according to ordinary 
concepts and as such are chargeable to tax by virtue of section 
38. 144 In Duff v C.I.R. 14
5 the Court of Appeal held unanimously 
that in determining whether a profit or gain is income the -
143. Ibid. 847. 
144. Section 38 provides that: 
(2) ... income shall be payable by every person on all income 
derived by him during the year for which the tax is 
payable. 11 
145. [1982] 2 N.Z.L.R. 710; supra n.21 and accompanying text. 
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proper approach is to consider whether it is income according to 
ordinary principles before having recourse to the extended 
meanings of income contained in section 65(2). Based on the 
argument made in Part II C of this paper, it could be argued that 
fringe benefits are income according to ordinary principles being 
something provided in money's worth which comes in to the 
taxpayer. That a particular benefit may not be convertible into 
cash would be irrelevant as income in its ordinary sense need not 
necessarily be in cash or in the form of something which is 
convertible into cash. 146 
Richardson and Congreve recognise that an argument could be made 
to tax fringe benefits under section 38. However, the learned 
authors state: 147 
Whatever the arguments which might have been made 
along those lines, the present position seems 
clear, namely, that the taxation of fringe benefits 
is governed exclusively by [section 65(2)(b)] and 
by other specific provisions. This for two 
reasons : first, the Commissioner has always 
approached the problem, and the Courts have 
dealt with it on that basis, and, second, in a 
sense as a result of the practice of the 
Commissioner and the approach of the Courts, 
fringe benefits falling outside these specific 
provisions have not in New Zealand been 
regarded as income according to ordinary 
concepts. 
With respect, those arguments may readily be disposed of. First, 
although it may previously have been the practice to determine 
whether a profit or gain is income solely by reference to the 
provisions of section 65(2), Duff established quite clearly that 
the correct approach is to consider whether the profit or gain is 
income according to ordinary principles before regard is had to 
section 65(2). And secondly, fringe benefits falling outside 
146. See Part II C under the heading "Employment v non-
employment income: is the convertibility principle 
universal?". 
147. Supra n.10 p.13. 
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section 65(2)(b) have not previously been regarded as income 
according to ordinary concepts simply because no argument has 
previously been made before the courts that they are income in 
the ordinary sense of that word. In the light of Duff and the 
points made in Part II of this paper as to the nature of income, 
the failure to raise such an argument is clearly open to 
reappraisal. 
b. Canada, Australia and the United Kingdom. 
In Canada, Australia and the United Kingdom the courts have 
construed general anti-avoidance provisions less strictly than in 
New Zealand. Section 6(l)(a) of the Canadian Income Tax Act, 
which includes within 11 income from office or employment
11 all 
11 benefits of any kind whatever
11
, fel 1 to be construed in Waffle 
148 
v. M.N.R. There, the taxpayer, a shareholder-employee in a 
Ford motor vehicle dealership, was awarded a holiday for two in 
the Carribean. The Minister assessed the taxpayer in the amount 
of $1384 - being the cost of the trip to Ford - on the grounds 
that the cost of the trip fell within the terms of the expression 
11 other benefits of any kind whatever
11
• In the Exchequer Court, 
Cattanach J. upheld the Minister's assessment. His Honour 
said 149 
The obvious intention of [section 6(l)(a)] is to 
include in the taxable income of a taxpayer those 
economic advantages arising from his employment 
which render the taxpayer's office of greater value 
to him. 
Moreover, the learned judge gave short shrift to the taxpayer's 
argument that section 6(l)(a) applies only to benefits which are 
convertible into cash 
150 
I think that the language employed in [section 6] 
to the effect that the 'value of board, lodging 
and other benefits of any kind whatever' is to be 
included in taxable income, overcomes the 
principle laid down in Tennant v Smith. 
Obviously board which has been consumed and 
lodging which has been enjoyed cannot be 
converted into money by the taxpayer either 
subsequently or prior thereto and, in my view, 
the identical considerations apply to 'other 
benefits of any kind whatever'. 
148. [1968] C.T.C. 572. 
149. Ibid. 577. 
150. Ibid. 578. 
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The broad language in the Canadian provision is therefore 
sufficient to bring within the charge to tax any benefits 
151 
conferring an economic advantage on the taxpayer. This has 
encouraged the Canadian revenue authorities to issue a series of 
interpretation bulletins outlining the benefits which are 
regarded as taxable and those which are regarded as 
non-taxable. 152 The former include : board and lodging, 
rent-free and low-rent housing, holiday trips and tuition fees; 
and the latter : subsidised meals where the employees pay a 
reasonable charge, discounts on merchandise, transportation 
passes for the employees of bus and rail companies, and airline 
passes to airline employees where the employee does not pay less 
than 50 per cent of the economy fare. It will be seen that 
applying the test enunciated by Cattanch Jin Waffle v M.N.R. the 
items treated as non-taxable by the revenue in the strict sense 
qualify for tax treatment. However, it is no doubt considered to 
be administratively too onerous to seek to exact from employees 
tax on the value of discount purchases or on subsidised meals. 
The United Kingdom legislation contains a broadly framed general 
anti-avoidance provision similar to that in the Canadian 
legislation. Section 61 of the Finance Act 1976 provides 
(1) ... Where in any year a person is employed in 
director's or higher paid employment and -
(a) by reason of his employment there is provided 
for him, or for others being members of his 
family or household, any benefit to which this 
section applies, 
(b) 
there is to be treated as emoluments of the 
employment, and accordingly chargeable to 
income tax under Schedule E, an amount 
equal to whatever is the cash equivalent of 
the benefit. 
Section 61(1) therefore operates by including certain benefits 
within the Schedule E charge to tax. These benefits are listed 
in section 61(2) as : 
accommodation (other than living accommodation), 
entertainment, domestic or other services, and 
other benefits and facilities of whatsoever 
nature ... 
151. The value of employer-financed trips have also been held to 
be taxable in Ferguson v M.N.R. [1972] C.T.C. 2105; and 
Philp v M.N.R. [1970] C.T.C. 330. 
152. Interpretation Bulletin IT-470 1981 (as amended 22 February 
1982); reproduced in H. Stikman (ed.) Canada Tax Service 
(loose leaf, 8 vol., Richard De Boo. Canada) ch.6, 
pp.16A-18. 
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The expression ''other benefits and facilities of whatsoever 
nature" in section 61(2) has not been considered by the courts, 
however, it appears to be of wide import. Lord Denning, in Wicks 
& Johnson v Firth,
153 described section 61 as "a comprehensive 
clause designed to make fringe benefits taxable in the hands of 
h • • t 11 154 t e rec1p1en s. 
As with the Canadian and United Kingdom provisions, section 
26(e)
155 of the Australian Act would appear to be sufficiently 
wide to encompass fringe benefits. Any benefits not specifically 
mentioned would constitute benefits 
11 otherwise 11156 allowed, given 
or granted. However, there is an argument that section 26(e) 
applies only to benefits in kind which are convertible into cash. 
This stems from the Federal Court's holding in FCT v Cooke & 
Sherden that "income" according to ordinary concepts includes 
only money or that which is convertible into money, and from 
dicta in Hayes v FCT
157 that section 26(e) only applies to items 
which are income according to ordinary concepts. In Hayes, 
Fullagar J said 
158 
I doubt very much whether s.26(e) has the effect of 
bringing into charge any receipt which would not be 
brought into charge in any case ... by virtue of the 
general conception of what constitutes income ... The 
words 'directly or indirectly' are doubtless intended to 
cast the net very wide but it is clear that there 
must be a real relation between the receipt and an 
'employment' or 'services' ... If the receipt in the 
present case does not fall within the general conception 
of 'income', it is not, in my opinion, caught by 
section 26(e). 
The learned Judge's comments were made by way of obiter dictum, 
however support may be derived from Scott v C.of T. 
159 where 
I. I • d J · d 160 n1n eyer sa, : 
[Section 26(e)J does not bring within the tax-
gatherer's net money or moneys' worth that 
are not income according to ordinary concepts. 
Rather it prevents receipts of money or moneys 
worth that are in reality part of a taxpayer's 
income from escaping the net. 
153. [1982] 2 All E.R.9 (C.A), [1983] 2 A.C.214 (H.C). 
154. Ibid.12. 
155. Set out supra Part III.C.2 under the heading "Australia", 
156. In National Association of Local Government Officers v 
Bolton CorRoration [1942] 2 All E.R. 425,428 Lord Simon L.C. 
said that or otherwise" means simply "or in another way". 
157. (1956) 96 C.L.R. 47 (H.C.). 
158. Ibid. 54. 
159. (1966) 117 C.L.R. 514. 
160. Ibid. 
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Assuming that section 26(e) applies only to receipts that are 
income according to ordinary concepts, and assuming that in 
Australia income according to ordinary concepts applies only to 
money or that which is convertible into money,
161 then it follows 
that the only non-monetary benefits falling within the terms of 
section 26(e) are those which are convertible into money. If 
this analysis is correct then section 26(e) is not an effective 
anti-avoidance mechanism. At the same time, though, the courts 
appear willing to find that non-monetary benefits are convertible 
into cash. Therefore, by comparison with section 65(2)(b) of the 
New Zealand Act section 26(e) is not impotent in relation to 
fringe benefits. 
From the foregoing discussion of the various general 
anti-avoidance provisions it may be concluded that statutory 
formulae such as "other benefits of whatsoever nature", or 
"benefits of any kind whatever", are successful as against fringe 
benefits. There is an argument that the Australian provision 
applies only to convertible benefits, however that argument is 
yet to be tested and even if proved correct would not render the 
section tota l ly ineffective. The New Zealand provision must be 
seen as a special case, its limited effect being attributable to 
historical factors and judicial attitudesrather than to any 
inadequacy of the language employed. 
3. Common problems associated with general anti-avoidance 
provisions. 
a. Whether the benefit is provided in respect of employment. 
Fringe benefits are a phenomenon associated only with employment 
income. Therefore, the legislation governing their taxation 
generally makes specific reference to the employment 
relationship. Thus, section 26(e) of the Australian Income Tax 
Assessment Act 
161. This assumption is based upon FCT v Cooke & Sherden 
discussed supra. In discussing that case it was 
suggested that it was incorrectly decided, based as it 
was on the Tennant v Smith rationale. Be that as it may, 
the Federal Court's judgment was not appealed to the 
High Court and its ratio must be regarded as providing 
the test to be applied in Australia in determining 
whether or not an item is income. 
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1936 brings within the definition of assessable income any 
benefits provided "in respect of, or for or in relation directly 
or indirectly to, any employment", and section 6(1)(a) of the 
Canadian Income Tax Act includes within the definition of income 
from an office or employment any benefit provided "in respect 
of,in the course of, or by virtue of an office or employment." 
The limitations of such fonnulae were made apparent by the House 
of Lords judgment in Hochstrasser v Mayes. 
162 That case 
concerned a scheme run by I.C.I. Ltd. whereby transferring 
employees were reimbursed for losses sustained upon the sale of 
their houses. The House of Lords held that amounts paid to the 
taxpayer under the scheme were not taxable under Schedule E
163 on 
the grounds that the housing scheme was constituted by an 
agreement separate from the employment contract. 
Lord Cohen said :
164 
[I]t is not enough for the Crown to establish 
that the employee would not have received the 
sum on which tax is claimed had he not been an 
employee. The court must be satisfied that 
the service agreement was the causa causans and not 
merely the causa sine qua non of the receipt of 
the profit. 
In Hochstrasser v Mayes reimbursement would not have been made to 
the taxpayer if it were not for the fact that he was an employee 
of I.C.I. Ltd. However, the immediate cause of the payment was 
the collateral agreement rather than the taxpayer's employment. 
Accordingly, the sums reimbursed fell outside the statutory 
charge. 
The test enunciated in Hochstrasser v Mayes has also found favour 
in Canada. Faced with a similar factual situation to that 
obtaining in Hochstrasser v Mayes, Noel J. held in Ransom v 
165 
M.N.R. that : 
162. [1960] A.C. 376. 
163. Schedule E provides that tax is charged upon "[E]very 
person having or exercising an office or employment 
of profit ... in respect of all salaries, fees, 
wages, perquisites or profits whatsoever therefrom ... 
11 
164. [1960] A.C. 376, 394-395. 
165. [1967] C.T.C. 346, 358. 
The question whether a payment arises from an 
office or employment depends on its causative 
relationship to an office or employment, 
whether the services in the employment are 
the effective cause of the payment. I should 
add here the question of what was the effective 
cause of the payment i.e. to be found in the 
legal source of the payment ... 
Applying that test so long as the legal source of the benefit was 
not the contract of employment the benefit would not be taxable 
to the employee. It would therefore be a simple matter to 
provide tax free fringe benefits by way of collateral agreements 
or by setting up a trust in favour of various employees and 
providing benefits via that trust. Indeed, in Wicks & Johnson v 
Firth 166 Lord Denning attributes the enactment of section 61 of 
the Finance Act 1976 - the general fringe benefit anti-avoidance 
section in the United Kingdom - to the increase in the provision 
of fringe benefits occasioned by the Hochstrasser v Mayes 
d . . 16
7 
ec1s1on. 
The narrowing effect of the Hochstrasser v Mayes rationale could 
be overcome by adopting wider language. Section 26(e) of the 
Australian Income Tax Assessment Act 1936, for example, brings 
within a taxpayer's assessable income benefits which are 
"allowed, given or granted ... in respect of or for or in relation 
directly or indirectly to, any employment". The effect of that 
particular part of section 26(e) was considered in F.C.T. V 
Dixon. 168 There, the High Court held that weekly payments to 
make up the difference between the rate of civilian pay of an 
employee who had enlisted in the armed forces, and his defence 
force pay, was in the nature of income. Although the Court's 
decision in that regard finalised the matter, Dixon CJ and 
Williams J also discussed the operation of section 26(e). Their 
Honours said 
169 
166. [1982] 2 All E.R.9 (C.A.). 
167. Ibid. 12. 
168. (1952) 86 C.L.R. 540. 
169. Ibid 553-554. 
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It is hardly necessary to say that the words 'directly 
or indirectly' extend the operation of the words 
'in relation to'. In spite of their adverbial form 
they mean that a direct relation or an indirect relation 
to the employment or services shall suffice. A direct 
relation may be regarded as one where the employment 
is the proximate cause of the payment, an indirect 
relation is one where the employment is a cause less 
proximate, or, indeed, only one contributory cause. 
This analysis removes the distinction made in Hochstrasser v 
Mayes between situations where the employment agreement is the 
causa causans of the payment and those where it is only the causa 
sine qua non. So long as the employment is "one contributory 
cause" the requirements of section 26(e) are met. At the same 
time though, their Honours placed one limitation on section 
26(e) : 170 
We are not prepared to give s.26(e) a construction 
which makes it unnecessary that the allowance, 
gratuity, compensation, benefit, bonus or 
premium shall in any sense be a recompense or 
consequence of the continued or contemporaneous 
existence of the relation of employer and 
employee or a reward for services rendered given 
either during the employment or of or in consequence 
of its termination. 
In other words, the employment must at least be the sine qua non 
of the benefit if not the causa causans. It is thought, 
therefore, that benefits provided to shareholder-employees qua 
shareholder, rather than qua employee, would fall outside the 
scope of section 26(e). 
Circumvention of fringe benefit anti-avoidance legislation by the 
use of collateral agreements is no longer possible in the United 
Kingdom. Section 61 of the Finance Act 1976 brings to charge 
benefits which are provided 11 by reason of
11 the taxpayer's 
employment. By section 72(3) 11 all such provision as is mentioned 
in this Chapter which is made for an employee ... are deemed to be 
paid to or made for [the taxpayer] ... by reason of his 
employment." Therefore, the provision of a company car to an 
employee pursuant to a collateral agreement would be deemed to be 
provided by reason of that employee's employment. Furthermore, 
even without the deeming provision in section 72 it is clear from 
Wicks and Johnson v Firth




171. [1982] 2 All E.R.9. 
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is of wide effect. There I.C.I. Ltd established an educational 
trust for the benefit of children of their higher paid employees. 
I.C.I. made payments into the trust fund from which the trustees 
were empowered to award scholarships to deserving children. The 
Crown claimed that the students' parents were taxable under 
section 61 on the amounts received by the students. The Court of 
Appeal agreed. 172 Lord Denning considered that the expression 
11 by reason of his employment" was designed to close the gap left 
by Hochstrasser v Mayes. His Lordship said:
173 
The words cover cases where the fact of the 
employment is the causa sine qua non of the 
fringe benefits, that is where the employee 
would not have received fringe benefits 
unless he had been an employee. The fact of 
employment must be one of the causes of the 
benefit being provided, but it need not be 
the sole cause, or even the dominant cause. 
It is sufficient if the employment was an 
operative cause, in the sense that it was 
a condition of the benefit being granted. 
The conclusion reached by Lord Denning as to the meaning of 11 by 
reason of 11 is by and large the same as that reached by Di xon C.J. 
and Williams J in FCT v Dixon as to the effect of the relevant 
wording in section 26(e) of the Australian Act. However, any of 
the shortcomings in the Australian legislation are overcome in 
the United Kingdom legislation by the deeming provision in 
section 72(3). 
b. Third parties 
Fringe benefits are usually provided as part of an employee's 
salary package. The employee receives these benefits in addition 
to monetary compensation. It is therefore a common feature of 
fringe benefit anti-avoidance legislation that only benefits 
172. The taxpayer in Wicks & Johnson argued that the payments 
were exempt tax by s.375(1) of the Income Tax Act 1970 
which exempted "income arising from a scholarship". In 
the Court of Appeal Lord Denning agreed, holding that 
s.375 totally exempted scholarship income both to the 
recipient of the scholarship and to anyone else. 
Oliver and Watins L.JJ disagreed, holding that s.375 was 
limited to the recipient of the scholarship. In the 
House of Lords Lord Denning's interpretation of s.375 
prevailed (reported [1983] 2 A.C. 214). However, as that 
judgment did not turn on s.61(1) it is not considered 
in this paper. 
173. [1982] 2 All E.R. 9,17. 
provided to "the employee" are taxed. Accordingly, benefits 
provided to the employee's spouse, or to some other member of the 
employee's family, escape the tax net. Both the Australian and 
the Canadian legislation demonstrate this point. 
Section 26(e) of the Australian Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 
includes within assessable income certain benefits which are 
granted to "the" taxpayer. Thus, in a 1945 Board of Review
174 
case it was held that a gift of land to the taxpayer's wife did 
not constitute a benefit which had been granted to 
11 the 11 
taxpayer. On the other hand, more recently the Board held that 
payment of school fees by an employer was a benefit to the 
employee within the terms of section 26(e).
175 The Board 
reasoned that the taxpayer had been relieved of the burden of 
paying the fees so pro tanto he had received a taxable benefit. 
Neither case provides compelling authority as to whether benefits 
provided to third parties fall within the terms of section 26(e). 
Of more assistance are comments made by the Asprey Committee in 
its report on the Australian tax system. 
176 
The report states: 177
 
... it is doubtful whether the law is adequate to 
cover the case where the benefit is given, not to 
the employee, but to a member of his family 
In the Committee's view it is ... necessary, in 
order that all situations be clearly covered, to 
provided generally in section 26(e) that a benefit 
arising from the employment relationship enjoyed 
by a member of the employee's family be deemed 
to be a benefit derived by the employee. 
The Committee's recommendations were never acted on. Therefore, 
as stated in the first extract cited above, it is doubtful that 
section 26(e) covers fringe benefits granted to third parties. 
An even stronger argument exists in relation to the Canadian 
legislation for suggesting that it does not cover benefits 
174. Case 16 12 C.T.B.R.(O.S) 309 (1945). 
175. Case 61 C.T.B.R. (N.S) 537 (1979). 
176. Taxation Review Committee, Full Report, Parliamentary 
Paper No.136, 1975. 
177. Ibid. paras 9.4, 9.7. 
granted to third parties. Section 6(l)(a) of the Canadian Income 
Tax Act includes within the taxpayer's income benefits "received 
or enjoyed" by "him". By contrast, section 6(l)(e), which 
establishes the basis of the charge for employer-provided motor 
vehicles, includes within the charge vehicles provided to the 
taxpayer "or to a person related to him". It is suggested that 
apart from the fact that the language of section 6(l)(a) does not 
appear to cover third party benefits, the specific inclusion 
within section 6(l)(e) of motor vehicles provided for relatives, 
and the absence of any specific provision in section 6(l)(a) to 
the same effect, leads to the conclusion that section 6(1)(a) 
does not cover benefits given to third parties. 
As would be expected, the Legislature in the United Kingdom has 
moved to pre-empt any attempt to circumvent the anti-avoidance 
legislation by providing benefits to third parties. Section 
61(1) of the Finance Act 1976 brings to charge not only benefits 
provided to the taxpayer, but also those provided "for others 
being members of his family or household." Then, section 72(4) 
provides that "References to members of a person's family or 
household are to his spouse, his sons and daughters and their 
spouses, his parents and his servants, dependents and guests." 
Of course, the United Kingdom legislation may be too specific. 
By including certain specified persons others are automatically 
excluded. Therefore, although a taxpayer's spouse is included 
within the definition, his mistress is not. Nor, for that 
matter, are his brothers and sisters. Perhaps section 6(1)(e) of 
the Canadian Act, which merely refers to persons "related" to the 
taxpayer, provides a more effective formula for dealing with 
benefits provided for third parties. 
c. Valuation. 
As has already been indicated there are essentially three bases 
on which fringe benefits may be valued: cost to the employer, 
market value, and valuer to the taxpayer. One base may be 
appropriate for one type of benefit but not for another. Thus, 
although market value may be an appropriate base upon which to 
value a motor car benefit, value to the taxpayer may be more 
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appropriate for employer-provided accommodation. Therefore, 
where statutory provision is made for specific benefits, it is 
not uncommon for different methods of valuation to be adopted for 
different benefits. In the case of general anti-avoidance 
provisions, however, that approach is not possible. Accordingly, 
such provisions generally state that tax is to be levied on the 
11 va 1 ue" of the benefit without specifying how the benefit is to 
be valued. Section 6(l)(a) of the Canadian Act is couched in 
such general terms, providing only that "the value
11 of the 
benefit is to be included within the taxpayer's income. In 
Waffle v M.N.R.,
178 where the taxpayer was provided with an 
overseas trip, it was held that the taxpayer was assessable on 
the cost of the trip to the employer. Cattanach J said:
170 
I can see no grounds for holding that the amount should 
be limited to an assessment of an amount which the 
appellant might have spent on the trip himself if 
[the employer] had not borne that cost. 
Subjective factors were therefore ignored in arriving at the 
value of the trip. 
In the interpretation bulletins published by the Canadian revenue 
authorities it appears that the basis of valuation varies from be 
benefit to benefit. 
180 Lodging, rent free and low rent housing, 
holiday trips and the use of an employer's aircraft are valued 
according to market value. On the other hand, subsidised meals, 
tuition fees and the provision of financial counselling services 
are valued according to cost to the employer. It will be seen 
that the interpretation bulletins do not refer to value to the 
taxpayer as being an applicable basis of valuation. 
There is an argument that where the statute merely provides that 
the 11 value 11 of a benefit is taxable, then the proper basis of 
valuation is value to the taxpayer rather than cost to the 
employer or market value. That argument will be outlined when 
section 72 of the New Zealand Act is discussed later in the 
paper. 
178. [1968] C.T.C. 572; supra n.148 and accompanying text. 
179. Ibid.578. 
180. Supra n.152. 
In Australia section 26(e) is more specific as to the basis upon 
which benefits are to be valued. That section provides that "the 
value to the taxpayer" of benefits granted is to be included 
within assessable income. Subjective factors, such as onerous 
conditions attached to the use of the employer's property, are 
therefore relevant in determining the value of the benefit for 
tax purposes. However, in cases where value is difficult to 
ascertain it appears acceptable to determine value according to 
objective criteria. In Donaldson v F.C.r.
181 
Bowen C.J., in 
considering the valuation of a share option, said :
182 
[l]t is appropriate in ascertaining value to 
the taxpayer to determine what a prudent person 
in his position would be willing to give for 
the rights rather than fail to obtain them. 
Be that as it may, it is unlikely that Bowen C.J's test is of 
general application to benefits caught by section 26(e). What 
the prudent person is willing to pay for a particular benefit 
would not generally be representative of value to the taxpayer. 
In the United Kingdom the Finance Act 1976 provides a more 
specific method of valuing fringe benefits. Section 61(1) 
provides that benefits are chargeable "[in] an amount equal to 
whatever is the cash equivalent of the benefit". By section 
63(1) the "cash equivalent" is 11 an amount equal to the cost of 
the benefit, less so much (if any) of it as is made good by the 
employee to those providing the benefit." Primarily, cost to the 
employer is therefore the basis of valuation. Thus, if there is 
no cost to the employer, as with the provision of low interest 
loans, there is no "cash equivalent" under section 63(1), upon 
which tax can be levied.
183 
In the case of benefits provided by way of the transfer of 
second-hand assets, section 63(3) provides that the cost of the 
benefit, and hence the cash equivalent under section 63(1) is 
deemed to be "the market value of the asset at the time of 
181. (1974) 4 A.T.R. 530. 
182. Ibid. 546. 
183. As "the cash equivalent" of low interest loans could not 
be calculated under s.63(c) specific provision has been made 
in s.66. Section 66 provides that the "cash equivalent" of 
a low interest loan is equal to the amount of interest on 
the loan at the official rate (which is fixed by Order in 
Council) less any amount paid on the loan for the year. 
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transfer. 11 Specific provision is also made for determining the 
11 cost 11 of benefits which consist of the placing of an asset at 
the taxpayer's disposal. By section 63(4) the cost of such 
benefits is deemed to be 
11 the annual value of the use of the 
asset 11 plus any expense incurred in providing the benefit. The 
means by which the 11 annual value
11 is determined is set out in 
section 63(5). Basically, the annual value of benefits 
consisting of the use of land is calculated according to the 
market rental of that land, while the annual value of benefits 
consisting of the use of some other asset is twenty per cent of 
the market value of the asset. 
Shortly stated, the value of fringe benefits rendered taxable by 
section 61(1) is primarily cost to the employer with provision 
for market value to be the relevant yardstick in certain 
situations. No provision is made for subjective factors, such as 
limitations on the use of the asset provided as a benefit, to be 
taken into account. Therefore, if the benefit consisted of the 
provision of a personal computer, for example, but the employee 
was required to use the computer for employment related purposes, 
then the 11 cash equivalent" would still be calculated at twenty 
per cent of the market value of the computer
184 irrespective of 
the onerous conditions attached to its use. No doubt from the 
Revenue's point of view a scheme whereby subjective factors are 
ignored for the purposes of valuation is easier to administer. 
Nevertheless, such an arbitrary method of valuation could be 
unfair between taxpayers. Taking the above example of the 
computer provided for home use, if two employees were provided 
with such computers and only one was required to use the computer 
for employment purposes, each employee would still be taxed on 
the same amount: that is twenty percent of market value. A more 
equitable system would tax the employee having unrestricted use 
of the computer at a higher rate than the employee having to use 
the computer for employment purposes. 
Although the United Kingdom legislation addresses the problem of 
valuing fringe benefits, it does not deal satisfactoirly with 
benefits provided in the form of services. The provision of free 
or low cost legal or accounting services, for example, would 
184. By virtue of ss.63(4) and 63(5) of the Finance Act 1976. 
fall within the terms of section 61(1) as being 
11 other 
benefits ... of whatsoever nature." However, by section 61(3) -
the alternative methods of valuation not being relevant for the 
purposes of valuing benefits provided in the form of services -
the "cash equivalent" of the benefit so received is the cost of 
providing the services. In many cases it would be inpractical to 
value the provision of services in that manner. Take for example 
a large finance company with in-house investment analysts whose 
advice was provided free of charge to certain employees. The 
cost of providing the service could perhaps be determined 
according to the salary paid to the analyst and the time spent in 
giving the advice. But the cost would also include such factors 
as secretarial services and even mere indirect costs such as 
heating, lighting and air conditioning. Then there are questions 
of what types of advice confer taxable benefits. Would tips 
given over morning tea confer a benefit? Or would only more 
formal consultations qualify? 
Similar problems would be encountered with other services. 
Suppose, for example, that in the same finance company the tax 
returns of certain employees were prepared free of charge by 
in-house accountants and that it was possible to determine the 
cost of the services so provided by reference to the salaries 
paid to the accountants. It would follow that if the return of 
one employee was prepared by an accountant earning:fl0,000 per 
annum while that of another was prepared by an accountant earning 
cf12,ooo per annum, then the former employee would be taxed less 
merely because his return was prepared by someone earning less. 
In practice it is unlikely that benefits provided in the form of 
professional services are taxed. 
185 In most cases the difficulty 
of calculating the cost of such benefits would be insuperable. 
185. Simons Taxes (London, Butterworths, 1983) makes no mention 
of professional services in discussing fringe benefits. 
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E. Taxation of Fringe Benfits in the United States. 
1. Background. 
As was discussed in Part II D of this paper, the concept of 
"gross income" contained in section 6l(a) of the Inland Revenue 
Code 1954 is wide enough to encompass fringe benefits. It 
follows that in the United States there has been no need for 
anti-avoidance legislation aimed at fringe benefits. Strictly 
speaking, then, the taxation of such benefits in the United 
States should not be considered in the part of the paper dealing 
with fringe benefit anti-avoidance measures. However, the tax 
treatment of fringe benefits in the United States represents such 
a complete contrast to that in other jurisdictions that such a 
consideration is warranted at this stage. 
It has already been seen that taking as a starting point the 
proposition that fringe benefits are not taxable as income, the 
various Commonwealth jurisdictions have adopted legislative 
measures to ensure that those benefits are taxable. By 
comparison, in the United States the starting point is the 
proposition that fringe benefits are taxable and due both to 
legislative action and to administrative practice the move has 
been in the opposite direction towards their non-taxability. 
Therefore, commencing at polar opposites the fringe benefit tax 
regimes of the United States and the Commonwealth jurisdiction 
have moved towards each other's original starting points. The 
moves in the Commonwealth jurisdiction towards a fully taxable 
situation have already been discussed. In this section of the 
paper the moves in the United States in the opposite direction 
will briefly be considered. That consideration will look first 
at administrative practice and secondly at legislative action. 
2. Administrative practice. 
By and large it has been the admninistrative practice of the 
Commissioner of Inland Revenue to treat fringe benefits as 
non-taxable. Bittker
186 traces the Commissioner's treatment of 
186. Supra n.94. 
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fringe benefits back to Internal Revenue Service rulings of 1920 
and 1921 that supper money paid to employees working overtime, 
and that travel passes issued to railway employees and their 
families, did not generate taxable income. The learned author 
states: 188 
This relaxed administrative approach to fringe benefits 
has never been embodied in either an official 
statement of the applicable rules or a catalog of 
excludible items. There are, in fact, only a 
few isolated rulings and litigated cases 
exempting fringe benefits from taxation, and they 
can be matched in number by cases holding that 
a few other benefits are taxable. 
In view of the broad concept of income in the United States it is 
difficult to see why the Commissioner has treated fringe benefits 
as being non-taxable. One writer suggests that the 
admninistrative practice is due in some cases to perceived 
difficulties in valuation and in others to social policy.
189 
In 
the latter category is employer provided insurance. However, 
while it may be conceded that one of the major difficulties in 
taxing fringe benefits lies in valuation and that certain 
benefits 
do perform a socially desirable function, those reasons do not 
provide a compelling explanation for the practice. Perhaps the 
better explanation is that the administrative practice became 
established when fringe benefits were uncommon, so that when 
under the stimulus of high taxation their incidence increased it 
became difficult to reverse the practice without some form of 
legislative or regulatory action. Support for this hypothesis is 
derived from the fact that in 1975 the United States Treasury 
issued draft regulations governing the tax status of fringe 
benefits. 190 Although the regulations were never passed and 
Congress placed a moratorium on the promulgation of any further 
regulations, the fact that the Treasury sought to alter the tax 
status of fringe benefits by regulatory action indicates that the 
administrative practice is too firmly entrenched to be reversed 
merely by way of a change of policy. This serves to illustrate 
the large part the administrators of any tax system play in 
determining taxpayers 1 liability to tax. In large part, and this 
applies not only to the United States, tax liability depends not 
only on statutory rules but also to a complex of conventions, 
191 
practices, procedures and rules of thumb. 
190. Biffher, supra n,96, p eh 14, p4. 
191. For a paper to this effect in relation to the New Zealand 
tax system see R.C.Congreve 11 Tax Administration and 
Practice 11 (1983) 13 V.U.W.L.R.94. 
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3. Statutory provisions 
Congress has made specific provision for the exemption from tax 
of certain benefits. In view of the administrative treatment of 
fringe benefits it may well be thought that such exclusiory 
provision is superflous. Be that as it may, Congress has seen 
fit specifically to exempt employer-provided meals and 
accommodation. 191 group term life insurance up to $50,000 of 
. 192 l l . 193 d . . insurance, group ega services, and e ucation assistance 
programmes. 194 However, each exemption is subject to conditions. 
By section 120 of the Code, for example, amounts contributed by 
employers to qualified group legal services plans for employees 
or their families are excludable from the employees' gross 
income. But, in order to qualify, there must be a written plan, 
and the plan must be non-discriminatory as amongst the employees 
and shareholders of the company. If these conditions are not 
met, the amounts paid into the plan are taxable to the employee 
beneficiaries. Therefore, the curious situation can arise 
whereby statutory provisions enacted to exempt fringe benefits 
from tax can operate to render those benefits taxable. For if it 
were not for the statutory exclusion all of the benefits, and not 
only those meeting the relevant criteria, would have been treated 
as non-taxable by virtue of the Commisisoner's administrative 
practice. 
4. Conclusion. 
In effect, the tax treatment of fringe benefits in the United 
States is similar to that in New Zealand. By and large fringe 
benefits remain tax free in the hands of the taxpayers of both 
countries. The reasons for this generous tax treatment differ: 
in the United States administrative practice is the major factor; 
while in New Zealand the history and terms of the legislation are 
the cause. However, in both countries the reasons for the 
continued tax-free status of fringe benefits are similar. In 
191. Inland Revenue Code 1954, s.119. 
192. Ibid. s.79. 
193. Ibid. s.120. 
194. Ibid. s.127. 
76 
the United States, although the Treasury formulated draft 
regulations for the taxation of fringe benefits those were 
rejected by Congress. Bittker records that the draft regulations 
attracted criticism as being either too lenient or too severe. 195 
Political considerations therefore governed the withdrawal of the 
regulations and the subsequent moratorium placed on further 
regulations by Congress. In New Zealand the case for the 
taxation of fringe benefits was argued strongly by the Task Force 
on Tax Reform in 1982. 196 Although many of the Task Force's 
recommendations in relation to tax avoidance were acted on in the 
Income Tax Amendment Act (No.2) 1982, those in relation to fringe 
benefits were ignored. As in the United States, political 
considerations appear to have weighed heavily in the decision. 
Economic concepts of income demonstrate that in logic there are 
no grounds for excluding fringe benefits from the tax base, and 
overseas experience indicates that although there may be 
admninistrative difficulties in taxing fringe benefits those 
difficulties are not insuperable. Clearly, then, extraneous 
considerations, such as the reaction of the electorate, appear to 
have influenced the Government's decision. 
195. Supra n.96 ch.14, p.4. 
196. Report of the Task Force on Tax Reform (Government Printer, 
1982) pp.152-165. 
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IV. SPECIFIC FRINGE BENEFITS 
A. Background. 
Fringe benefits are provided in a myriad of shapes and forms. 
While it is not possible within the confines of this paper to 
compare the relative tax treatment of a large number of fringe 
benefits, a study of the taxation of several of the more common 
forms is warranted. To that end, consideration is given in this 
part of the paper to the taxation of employer-provided motor 
vehicles and employer-provided accommodation. 
B. Motor Vehciles 
1. Introduction 
Of all fringe benfits the provision of a car for an employee's 
use is perhaps the most common. In large part that phenomenon is 
due to the fact that where such provision is made benefits accrue 
both to the employer and the employee. The employer is able to 
claim a deduction for depreciation and for repairs and 
maintenance, while the employee receives a valuable benefit which 
he would otherwise have to pay for himself. Because of those 
advantages there is a strong incentive for any employer providing 
fringe benefits to include a car within the package. However, 
the high profile nature of car benefits means that where 
legislative action is taken against fringe benefits specific 
provision is generally made for their taxation. In discussing 
the taxation of motor car fringe benefits reference will briefly 
be made to their tax treatment in Australia and New Zealand. 
Then the recommendations of the New Zealand Task Force on Tax 
Reform in relation to motor car benefits will be considered. As 
the Task Force's recommendations appear to be based on Canadian 
and British legislation that consideration will necessarily 
entail a discussion of the Canadian and British statutory 
provisions. 
2. Tax status of car benefits in Australia and New Zealand. 
It has been seen that the general tax -free status of fringe 
benefits in New Zealand is attributable to the courts' 
restrictive construction of section 65(2)(b) of the Income Tax 
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Act 1976. Because of that construction, the Commission
er does 
not presently assess taxpayers on the value of car bene
fits. It 
may be argued that car benefits are income according to 
ordinary 
concepts and as such are taxable independently of sectio
n 
65(2)(b). 
197 Howver, the Commissioner has not adopted that 
argument and so any moves to tax car benefits would requ
ire 
legislative amendment. 
In 1982 the Task Force on Tax Reform reconmended that le
gislation 
should be enacted to render car benefits taxable.
198 Such a 
move, it was considered, would generate an annual revenu
e yield 
in the vicinity of $150 million. To date that recommend
ation has 
not been implemented. However, recent statements made b
y the 
Under Secretary for Finance, the Hon. Mr de Cleene, indi
cate that 
moves may be made in the near future to ensure that car 
benefits 
are brought within the tax net. 
199 Any such moves would most 
likely be based upon the Task Force's recommendations so 
further 
consideration will be given to those recommendations belo
w. 
In Australia car benefits are prima facie taxable by virtu
e of 
section 26(e). However, that section provides no practi
cal 
method by which car benefits could be valued. Provision
 is 
merely made for the "value to the taxpayer" of the benef
it to 
included within assessable income. Therefore, a host o
f 
subjective factors such as restrictions on use and the 
reliability of the car must be taken into account. 
b f . . A t 1 . 
200 th 
In view of the prevalence of car ene its 1n us ra ,a 
e 
197. Supra n.144 and accompanying text. 
198. Supra n.196 para 6.A.l. 
199. E.g. in The Dominion, Wellington, New Zealand, 17 A
ugust 
1974, pl 1t was stated: 
The company car - unless it is necessary for 
business - may be chopped as a tax avoidance perk. 
And the taxman will also be eyeing other tax 
avoidance perks such as the company boat and 
blatantly low interest mortgages, the new 
Under-Secretary for Finance, Mr Trevor de Cleene, 
said yesterday. 
be 
200. E.g. a survey of 17 August 1984 issue of the Austra
lian 
Financial Review revealed twelve situations vacant 
advertisements referring specifically to cars being prov
ided 
and numerous others referring to "salary packages" which 
in many cases would have included cars. 
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case by case approach to valuation contemplated by section 26(e) 
would clearly be impractical. That difficulty was recognised 
by the Australian government and in 1974 comprehensive 
legislation governing the valuation of car benefits was 
enacted. 201 B . 11 . . 
11 as,ca y, prov1s1on was made for the stand-by 
value" of a car made available for the taxpayer's private use to 
be included within his assessable income. The "stand-by value" 
was to be calculated on a percentage of the purchase price of the 
car. That provision was shortlived, however, and before coming 
into operation was repealed in 1975. 
The current tax status of motor car benefits in Australia is 
summed up in the following statement of the Federal Commissioner 
of Taxation :202 
It is important to keep in mind that it is the 
value to the employee of the benefit which is 
subjected to tax. No liability arises if an 
employee is simply provided with a car to use 
in carrying out his official duties and 
even where an employee also uses the car for 
private purposes the Commissioner would not 
expect any amount to be included in the 
employee's income tax return if this private 
use was only occasional and relatively 
insignificant ... [However] where a taxpayer 
does gain a substantial benefit from the 
provision of a car by his employer, he should 
make a reasonable estimate of the value to him 
of that benefit and include that value in his 
return. If in doubt he can set out the 
facts in his return and leave it to the 
assessor to make a determination. 
Therefore, whether the value of the use of a car is included 
within a taxpayer's income appears to be a matter left largely to 
the taxpayer's discretion. It is unlikely that any but the most 
diligent taxpayer would include the value of the use of a car in 
his annual return. And it is even less likely that a taxpayer 
would file a return setting out the facts of his use of an 
employer-provided car so as to enable an assessor to make a 
determination. It follows that for practical purposes it is a 
simple matter to avoid the operation of section 26(e) in relation 
to car benefits. 
201. Act.No. 126, 1974, which inserted s.26 AAB into the Income 
Tax Assessment Act 1936. 
202. Reported in Commerce Clearing House. Australian Federal Tax 
Reporter para 13-695. 
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3. The Task Force's recommendations. 
The Task Force were concerned primarily with setting out various 
options as to how car benefits could be valued for tax purposes. 
Three options were suggested without any preference being 
expressed. 
The first option suggested by the Task Force was to calculate the 
taxable value by applying a fixed percentage rate to the cost of 
the car. Table 2 indicates current
203 operating costs of cars of 
all sizes. 
























Based upon Table 2 the taxable value of a small car would be 2.9 
per cent per month of the cost of that car. The annual value 
would therefore be calculated as follows :-
($12,537 X 2·9) X 12 = $4,368. 
100 
203. Table 2 was compiled from information contained in New 
Zealand Motor World August 1984. The figures represent 
the cost of purchasing and operating a car prior to the 
devaluation and the price increase in petrol announced in 
July 1984. 
204. Vehicle size: "Small" Mazda 323 hatchback; Honda Civic LX; 
Toyota Starlet D.X 3-door 
"medium" - Ford Tel star 1 .6.L; Honda Accord 
LX 4 door; Toyota Corona G.L. 
"large" - Ford Falcon 4.1 G.L; Holden 
Commodore Berlina 
205. New Zealand Motor World August, 1984. p.4. 
206. Approximate costs were calculated by taking the average 
cost of the cars listed in n.204. The cost of these 
cars may be found in New Zealand Motor World August 1984 
p.93-94. 
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However, the Task Force recommended that the rate to be applied 
should be fixed at the low level of two per cent per month. It 
was considered that that lower figure took into account the fact 
that the operating costs of the car could in many cases be met by 
the employee; that the car could be superior to that which the 
employee would have purchased for his own use; and that there 
could be restrictions placed on the private use of the car. 
Using the Task Force's recommended two per cent rate the annual 
taxable value of a small car would be calculated as follows :-
($12,537 X ~) X 12 
100 
= $3,000 
The Task Force's first option is similar to the basis of 
valuation adopted by Canada. By section 6(l)(e) of the Canadian 
Income Tax Act employer provided motor vehicles are taxable to 
the employee in the amount by which "a reasonable standby charge" 
exceeds any amounts paid by the employee for the use of the 
vehicle. By section 6(2) the "reasonable standby charge" is 
calculated basically at two per cent per month of the cost of the 
car. The actual charge is calculated according to the number of 
days in the year during which the automobile is actually made 
available to the employee divided by 30 and rounded to the 
nearest whole number. That formula may be represented as 
follows: : 
days car made available 
(2% of cost) x ---~-----
30 
= reasonable standby 
charge. 
Supposing, for example, that a car cost $12,000 and was made 
available for the employee's private use for 150 days in the 
income year. In that situation the "reasonable standby charge" 
would be calculated as follows 
(2% X $12,000) X 
= $240 X 
150 
30 
5 = $1,200 reasonable standby 
charge 
By section 6(2)(k) the standby charge may be reduced if the 
employee establishes that actual use of the vehicle for private 
purposes is less than 1000 kilometres per month. In that case, 
82 
the standby charge is reduced according to the number of 
kilometres for which the car is actually used. The formula thus 
altered may be represented as follows :-
{2% of cost) x days car made available x kilometres used 
= 
30 number of months 
available x 1000 
reasonable standby charge 
Using the above example, where the car was available for five 
months, the following result obtains where the car was only used 
for 3000 kilometres: 






5 X 1000 
3 
X 5 X -5 
= $720 reasonable standby charge 
Provision is also made for the calculation of a standby cha rge 
where the employer leases the motor vehicle. The basic charge 
for a leased car is two thirds of the rental cost of the car for 
the period it is made available to the employee. If, for 
example, the rental cost of a car was $150 per month and it was 
made available for five months then the standby charge would be 
calculated as follows 




Two features of the Canadian scheme are noteworthy. First, there 
is provision to reduce the standby value of the car benefit where 
the car is used for private purposes for less than 1000 
kilometres per month. That concession places an onus on any 
employee seeking to lower the standby charge to keep a record of 
the distance he has travelled in the car and of the proportion of 
that distance which has a private element. From the taxpayer's 
point of view the concession has the advantage of allowing use of 
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the car to be taken into consideration in calculating the amount 
upon which tax is to be levied; and from the revenue's point of 
view it has the advantage of being relatively simple to 
administer as the onus is placed on the taxpayer to establish the 
extent to which the car is used for private purposes. 
The second noteworthy feature of the Canadian scheme is that the 
standby charge is a function of the cost of the vehicle rather 
than of its depreciated (book) value. It could perhaps be argued 
that that basis of valuation would be unfair to the taxpayer 
after the car had been used for several years its value for tax 
purposes would be based upon an artificially high cost. Indeed, 
such arguments appear to have persuaded the Task Force into 
recommending as a second option that the charge be based upon the 
book value of the car. In practice, however, to base the charge 
upon book value would prove overly generous to the taxpayer. The 
Commissioner allows depreciation on motor cars on a twenty per 
d · · h · 1 b . 
207 I . bl 11 f cent 1m1s 1ng va ue as,s. nvar,a y an a owance or 
depreciation at that rate will be higher than an allowance 
calculated upon the actual depreciation suffered by the car. 
Table 3, constructed from information contained in the August 
1984 issue of New Zealand Motor World
208 and from the Inland 
Revenue Department's information pamphlet on depreciation 
allowances, provides evidence to that effect. 
Table 3: Actual depreciation of motor cars compared with 
h C • • I t 209
 
depreciation at t e omm1ss1oner s ra es. 
Vehicle Size Average Cost Actual Depre- Depreciation at the 
ciation Commissioner's rate 
of 20% D.V. 
Small $12,537 $1,440 $2,507 
Medium 17,371 2,160 3,474 
Large 26,274 3,056 5,254 
207. Inland Revenue Department Information Pamphlet "Depreciation 
Allowances" April, 1984. 
208. Supra. n.206. 
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It will be seen from Table 3 that for cars of all sizes actual 
depreciation is considerably less than the depreciation allowed 
by the Commissioner. Therefore, if the charge was to be 
calculated on the book value then after the car had been used for 
several years the charge would be based upon an artificially low 
cost rather than an artificially high cost. It follows that the 
Task Force's second option would not provide a practical method 
of valuing car benefits. 
The Task Force's third option was to fix a specific value which 
varies according to the size of the car. The specific value 
selected by the Task Force was 2 per cent of the approximate 
vehicle cost. Table 4 contains the values which would apply 
under that formula in 1981 and 1984 terms. 
Table 4. Value of car benefit calculated according to car 
. 210 size. 
Size of car Approximate value to be assessed for each 
month of availability 
Small (up to 1350 c.c.) 
Medium (1350 to 2000 c.c.) 









It will be seen that the Task Forces' first and third options are 
in effect similar. The annual value of a small car applying 
Table 4 would be $3,000, as it would be for an average car under 
the Table 2 rates. The difference between the two options is 
that in the first the calculation is made by applying the 2 per 
cent rate to the cost of the actual vehicle while in the third it 
is made by applying that rate to the average cost of vehicles of 
the same size. 
209. Vehicle size and average cost are calculated on the same 
basis as in Table 2 supra. Actual depreciation was 
calculated from a table contained in New Zealand Motor 
World (supra n.205) p.4. 
210. 1981 figures were taken from the Task Force's report (supra 
n.196) p.159; 1984 figures were calculated as 2 per cent of 
the approximate vehicle costs contained in Tables 2 and 3 
supra. 
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It will also be seen from Table 4 that if the value of car 
benefits is to be calculated as a percentage of the cost of the 
car then the table rates would have to be amended regularly. In 
inflationary times it would be necessary to amend the table rates 
annually if they were to bear any relationship to the current 
costs of vehicles. 
The Task Force expressed no preference as to which basis of 
valuation should be adopted. The second option - whereby value 
is calculated upon book value - has been discounted as being 
impractical. The first option would more accurately represent 
the value of the benefit received by the employee if that benefit 
is to be determined according to the cost of the car. However, 
the third option would be easier to administer as it would merely 
involve ascertaining the size of a particular car and then 
applying the table rates. Neither option takes into account 
the age of the car, and, although the Task Force indicated that 
the percentage rate was fixed at two per cent in recognition of 
the fact that many taxpayers would travel less than 16,000 
kilometres, neither option effectively takes into consideration 
the distance travelled by the taxpayer. A basis of valuation 
which took such factors into account would appear to be fairer. 
The United Kingdom legislation demonstrates that it is possible 
to value car benefits on the basis of a tabular charge and take 
subjective factors, such as the age of the car, into account at 
the same time. By section 64(1) of the Finance Act 1976 
directors and higher paid employees are taxable on cars provided 
by reason of their employment and which are available for private 
use. Tax is levied on the "cash equivalent" of the benefit of 
the car which is calculated according to scale charges set out in 
Schedule 7 of the Act. The scale charges are updated annually by 
Order in Council, the latest being set out in Table 5.
211 
211. As amended by the Income Tax (Cash Equivalents of Car 
Benefits Order) 1983 s.1. 1983/1102. 
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Table 5.: Tabular charges in the United Kingdom. 
TABLE A 
CARS WITH ORIGINAL MARKET VALUE UP TOf.16,000 AND HAVING A 
CYLINDER CAPACITY 
Cylinder capacity of car 
in cubic centimetres 
Age of car at end of relevant 
year of assessment 
Under 4 years 4 years or more 
1,300 or less t 375 
More than l ,300 but not more than l ,800 480 





CARS WITH ORIGINAL MARKET VALUE UP TOtl6,000 AND NOT HAVING A 
CYLINDER CAPACITY 
Original market value of car 
Age of car at end of relevant 
year of assessment 
Under 4 years 4 years or more 
Less than t 4,950 
i:4,950 or more, but less thanf-7,000 









CARS WITH ORIGINAL MARKET VALUE MORE THAN[l6,000 
Original market value of car 
More than h6 ,000 but not more 
than i24,000 
More than-*24,000 
Age of car at end of relevant 
year of assessment 
Under 4 years 4 years or more 




It will be seen that the "cash equivalent" is based either upon 
the cylinder capacity of the car or upon its "original market 
value". Unlike Canada, some concession is made for the age of 
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the car in that different rates apply depending on whether the 
car is over or under five years old. Concession is also made for 
the distance travelled in Part l of Schedule 7 of the Act which 
sets out the rates at which the table charges are to be applied. 
Table 6 contains these rates. 
Table 6. Rates of charge in the United Kingdom. 
Business travel (miles) 
More than 18,000 
2500 - 18,000 





The operation of the United Kingdom legislation is best 
illustrated by an example. Suppose that in the 1984 income year 
a company makes available to one of its employees a 1981 Ford 
Cortina with a cylinder capacity of 2500 cubic centimetres and an 
original market value of£8,500. As the original market value is 
belowf:16,000, and the car has a cubic capacity, the scale charge 
is calculated under Table A. And as the cubic capacity is more 
than 1800 and the car is less than four years old the relevant 
charge ist 750. Suppose, however, that the car is not used for 
any business purposes whatsoever. In that case, by virtue of 
Part l of Schedule 7 the charge to tax comprises one and a half 
times the table rate Or in the example givene750 X 1.5 = tl,125. 
c. Accommodation. 
l. Introduction 
The provision of accommodation by an employer is a convenient and 
practical means of compensating employees. For that reason, all 
of the countries surveyed have enacted legislation governing the 
provision of benefits by way of free or low rental housing. As 
with motor car benefits, identifying the existence of a benefit 
is not difficult. The major problem lies in valuation. 
Accorrmodation is not always provided solely for the benefit of 
the employee. Thus, accomodation for a ship
1 s crew, for example, 
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may properly be regarded as a condition of employment rather than 
a fringe benefit. Similarly, the provision of luxurious 
accommodfation for an executive with the proviso that it be used 
to entertain company clients will not be of the same worth to the 
employee as the provision of accommodation with no strings 
attached. In order to overcome such difficulties, Australia and 
the United Kingdom have adopted statutory rules by which the 
value of an accommodation benefit is more easily able to be 
determined. On the other hand, in New Zealand and Canada, there 
are no such rules and tax is levied on the 11 value 11 of the 
benefit. Problems may therefore arise in determining to what 
extent, if any, subjective factors are to be taken into account 
in determining value. Then, in the United States, the provision 
governing accommodation benefits is exclusionary: excluding 
accommodation benefits from the tax net so long as certain 
criteria are met. 
2. New Zealand 
In New Zealand the taxation of accommodation benefits is governed 
by section 72 of the Income Tax Act 1976. That section provides: 
Without limiting the meaning of the term 'allowances' 
as used in section 65(2)(b) of this Act, the said 
term shall be deemed to include (in the case of 
a taxpayer who in any income year has been provided 
in respect of any office or position held by him 
with board or lodging, or the use of a house or 
quarters, or has been paid an allowance instead of 
being so provided with board or lodging or with 
the use of a house or quarters) the value of those 
benefits; and the value of the benefits shall 
be determined in case of dispute by the 
CoITTTiissioner. 
Although section 72 clearly identifies the benefits which are 
deemed to be allowances within the terms of section 65(2)(b), it 
is of little assistance in calculating the value of the benefit. 
By merely stating that "the value of those benefits" is an 
allowance section 72 does not indicate whether "value" in that 
context is value to the taxypayer, market value, or cost to the 
employer. Staples suggests that section 72 contemplates that 
the full market value of the accommodation be brought within the 
• 212 I.I• h t th t • • taxpayer's assessable income. ~,t respec , a view 1s 
incorrect. In the context of section 72 "value" means value to 
the taxpayer rather than market value. After listing the 
212. Staples Guide to New Zealand Income Tax Practice (44 ed, 
Sweet & Maxwell N.Z. Ltd., Auckland, 1984) para. 55. 
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benefits to which the section applies, section 72 provides that 
it is the 11 value of those benefits" which is deemed to be an 
allowance. The word 11 benefits 11 in that context is not used as a 
term of art, but rather in its ordinary sense to mean an 
213 "advantage, profit or good." Therefore, in determining the 
11 benefiC under section 72 any factors which reduce that benefit 
must be taken into account. Where, for example, an employee was 
provided with a house for which he paid a market rent it could 
hardly be argued that the market rental value of the house could 
be brought within the employee's assessable income. In that 
situation, the employee has derived no benefit other than the 
intangible benefit of having a roof over his head. 
In practice the Commissioner has adopted a number of rules of 
thumb for calculating value for the purposes of section 72. 
Those rules of thumb, although generous to taxpayers assessed 
under section 72, have no statutory basis. To methods of 
valuation are adopted: first, accommodation benefits in certain 
industries are valued according to a fixed value; and secondl y in 
the case of employee-shareholder accommodation, the value is 
calculated as a function of the cost price of the accommodation. 
Hotel workers fall into the former category. The Inland Revenue 
Department's internal rulings 214 provide that the value of 
accommodation to hotel keeps and hotel managers is to be 
calculated as follows:
215 
( l ) Hotels, three star and 
216 over -
$208 per annum in respect of licensee 
$208 per annum in respect of licensee's wife or 
husband. 
$208 per annum in respect of adult members of 
family or any relatives staying free of charge. 
$52 per annum for each child over 6 years of age. 
213. Shorter Oxford Dictionary. 
214. Access to which is available upon application under the 
Official Information Act 1982. These rulings will hereafter 
be referred to as the "Departmental rulings". 
215. Departmental rulings Ch.19 Part I para 55. 
216. The reference to stars is presumably to the star rating 
system developed by the Automobile Associ ation in its 
guides to accommodation. 
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(2) Hotels, graded below three star 
$156 per annum in respect of the licensee. 
$156 per annum in respect of the licensee's wife 
or husband and adult members of family. 
Where there are children over 6 years of age -
$130 per annum in respect of licensee. 
$130 per annum in respect of licensee's wife or husband. 
$130 per annum in respect of adult members of the 
family and relatives staying free of charge. 
- $52 per annum in respect of each child over 6. 
The value of board and lodging for hotel workers is fixed at $2 
per week. 
The Departmental rulings also make prov1s1on for farm employees. 
The weekly value of various benefits t2 1,uch emplo
yees has been 
f i xed by the Commissioner as follows : 
Details of 
hl lowance 
Single man or married 
man accompanies by 
wife/children 
Married man accom-
panied by wife/ 
children 









Where a free house is supplied to a farm employee the 
Departmental rulings advocate a case by case approach to 
218 
valuation. They state: 
The value assessed should be realistic bearing 
in mind the value of the house and its 
remoteness from town ... A rental value of 
$2 per week is suitable in the majority of 
cases but in special cistcumstances when the 
accommodation is above or below the average 
standard, this value could be varied upwards 
or downwards. For example, a farm manager 
occupying a high standard dwelling could possibly 
be assessed with a rental value up to $6 per 
week. These values quoted are only a guide 
and should not be regarded as necessarily 
appropriate to all cases. 
It will be seen that the values fixed by the Commissioner bear 
little relationship to the actual value of the benefit to the 
217. Departmental rulings Ch.19, Pt.IV, para 14. 
218. Idem. 
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taxpayer. While it may be necessary for administrative purposes 
to adopt rules of thumb as to how benefits under section 72 are 
to be valued, to be effective the fixed rates would have to be 
updated on a regular basis. However, it appears that these rates 
have not been altered for many years. Staples first referred to 
the taxation of accommodation benefits provided for hotel 
employees in its 1945 edition, 219although the precessor of 
section 72 had been inserted into the Land and Income Tax Act 
1923 in 1932. 220 The 1945 edition stated: 221 
In the case of a hotelkeeper's or hotel manager's 
assessment, an estimated amount is added to cover 
the cost of domestic establishment, i.e. an 
estimate of the value of keep, rent, etc, applicable 
to private domestic purposes. The amount to be 
added will be in accordance with the following 
schedule :-
1. City and Town hotels catering for the 
travelling public and providing good accommodation. 
£-104 annum in licensee per respect of the 
:k,104 per annum in respect of the licensee's wife 
or husband * 26 per annum in respect of each child over 6 years 
of age. 
2. Country hotels and city and town hotels which do not 




per annum in respect of the licensee. 
per annum in respect of the licensee's wife or 
husband. Where, however, there are children 
over 6 years of age the amounts will be : 
per annum each in respect of the licensee and 
the wife or husband, and 
per annum in respect of each child over 6 years £26 
of age. 
The Commissioner's fixed rates fo 222arm employees also have their 
origin in 1945. Staples stated: 
In the case of free housing the employer should 
assess the rental at a fair and reasonable 
figure, having regard to current rental values. 
In the case of food and/or lodging for farm 
employees, the Commissioner has assessed the 
value to the employee as follows :-
219. Staples A Guide to New Zealand Income Tax Practice (6 ed. 
Financial Publications Ltd., Wellington, 1945). 
220. By s.3 of the Land and Income Tax Amendment Act 1932-1933. 
221. Supra n.219 p.142. 
222. Ibid. 133. 
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Food and Lodging 
Food only 
Lodging only 
Single Man or Married 
Man not accompanied 
by wife and/or 
children 
i. 1 0 0 
{ 0 15 0 
to 5 o 
Married Man accom-
panied by wife and/ 
or eh i1 dren 
t 2 o o 
t.1 10 0 
to 10 o 
Therefore, apart from the alterations necessitated by the change 
to decimal currency in 1967, the rates applied by the 
Commissioner in 1984 remain the same as those applied almost 
forty years ago. Clearly, while it may have been realistic in 
1945 to assess the value of accommodation to a hotel manager as 
fl04 it is no longer realistic to assess him on the dollar 
equivalent of that sum. 
The second method of valuation adopted by the Commissioner is to 
apply a formula based on the cost of the accommodation. For 
shareholder employees whe value is valuclated as the total 
of :223 
(a) 3% of cost price - including land, 
(b) Depreciation at normal scale rates 
(c) Repairs and maintenance 
( d) Rates and insurance. 
A similar formula is applied to accommodation supplied to marired 
farm employees who are related to the owner of the farm and to 
224 part proprietor employees. However, in the case of such 
employees the formula is calculated upon three per cent of the 
cost of the building only and provision is made to reduce the 
value if it is not situated in a domestic area. Suppose, for 
example, that a part-proprietor employee of a farming enterprise 
occupies rent free a brick dwelling erected at a cost of $25,000 
(excluding land). Annual insurance costs are $300 and repairs 
and maintenance cost $450. In that case, the value for the 
purposes of section 72 would be calculated as follows : 
223. Departmental rulings Ch.5 Part 1 para.54. 
224. Idem. 
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3% of $25,000 













Specific provision is also made in the Departmental rulings for 
determining the value of accommodation supplied to executives in 
bl . . 225 I pu ,c companies. t is stated that in calculating the value 
of such accommodation the fact that the executive may have no 
choice of accommodation, that he may be required to occupy more 
pretentious premises than he would otherwise have selected, and 
that he may be required to entertain company clients, should be 
taken into consideration. In cases of doubt it is recommended 
that the following formula be used as a guide : 
( i) 
( i i ) 
(iii) 
( i V) 
3% of cost price including land 
5% of cost of furniture (if provided) 
repairs and maintenance 
rates and insurance. 
As with the fixed value method of valuation the formulae adopted 
by the Commissioner bear no relationship to the requirements of 
section 72. First, section 72 does not contemplate the value of 
the accommodation benefit as being a function of the cost price 
of the accommodation. And secondly, it is difficult to 
understand how amounts deducted for rates, insurance, 
depreciation and repairs and maintenance can be included within 
the formula for the purposes of calculating the value to the 
employee. In relation to shareholder-employees the rationale is 
presumably that as the employee controls the company he has 
already derived an economic benefit when the company claimed a 
deduction for those various items. Therefore, it could be 
argued, in calculating the value of the benefit to the employee 
those items should be taken into account as they represent part 
of the benefit that he has derived. However, that rationale 
ignores the separate personality of the company and its 
shareholders. In view of that separate personality it is 
illogical to connect deductions claimed by a company with 
benefits accruing to an employee of the company. 
225. Idem. 
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It will be seen from the above discussion of section 72 that the 
methods of valuation adopted by the Commissioner bear little 
relationship to the actual value of the accomodation. In large 
part that is attributable to the language of the section. Little 
assistance is provided as to how 11 value 11 should be calculated. 
Ideally a case by case approach should be adopted, but for 
reasons of administrative efficiency and in the interests of 
maintaining consistency between different Inland Revenue 
Department offices it is imperative that some form of 
administrative rules be adopted. If the rules or guides to 
valuation which have been identified in this section of the paper 
were amended to reflect current values of accommodation it is 
likely that he would be met with taxpayer resistence. 
Accordingly, if accommodation benefits are to be effectively 
taxed in New Zealand it would be necessary to enact legislation 
detailing fully the manner in which those benefits are to be 
valued. Both the United Kingdom, and Australia have enacted 
legislation to that effect. 
3. Australia and the United Kingdom. 
Both Australia and the United Kingdom have enacted comprhensive 
legislation to enable accommodation benefits to be valued for tax 
purposes. 
Section 26(e) of the Australian Act provides that the 
11
value to 
the taxpayer ... of the use of premises or quarters
11 
is to be 
included within the taxpayer's assessable income. By section 
26AAAA a number of factors which the Commissioner is required to 
take into account in determine that value are set out. These 
comprise: the remoteness of the location of the accommodation; 
whether it is customary for employees in the taxpayer's industry 
to be provided with accommodation benefits; whether there is any 
reasonable alternative accommodation; whether the accommodation 
is of a higher standard or is of a larger size than could 
reasonably be expected to be provied for the taxpayer; and 
whether any onerous conditions are attached to the use of the 
accommodation. 
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In practice the application of section 26AAAA can have a marked 
effect on the value of accommodation. Case 12226 concerned a 
minister who lived rent free in a house owned by his church. The 
market rental of the house was between $2680 and $2860 per annum. 
However, by applying the discounting factors set out in section 
26AAAA the Commissioner arrived at an assessable value, 
subsequently upheld by the Board of Review, of $585 per annum. 
Similarly, in Case 77 227 the assessable value of acconvnodation to 
a prison officer was reduced from $30 per week to $15 per week 
due to the fact that the accommodation was located within the 
prison grounds. 
Provision is also made in the Australian legislation for the 
value of the accommodation to be reduced where the accommodation 
. . t 228 h h l 1s 1n a remo e area, or were t e taxpayer is required to ive 
within close proximity of his work place. In such cases, section 
26AAAB provides that the value of the benefit is ten percent of 
the annual rental value of the accommodation reduced by any 
consideration paid by the taxpayer. 
As the result of the combined effect of sections 26AAAA and 
26AAAB a fair approximation is able to be made as to the value t o 
the taxpayer of the accommodation benefit. In the United 
Kingdom, on the other hand, the valuation of accommodation 
benefits is more arbitrary. Section 33(c) of the Finance Act 
1977 provides 
... where living accommodation is provided for a 
person in any period by reason of his employment.:· 
he is to be treated for Schedule E purposes as being 
in receipt of emoluments of an amount equal to the 
value to him of the accommodation for the period, 
less so much as is properly attributable to that 
provision of any sum made good by him to those at 
whose cost the accommodation is provided. 
226. 26 C.T.B.R. (N.S.) p.100 (1982). 
227. 26 C.T.B.R. (N.S.) p.531 (1982) . 
228. 
. 
By s.26AAAB(l) an area is remote if neither the 
accommodation nor the taxpayer's usual place of employment 
was located in or near an eligible urban area. "Eligible 
urban area 11 is defined in s.26AAAB(lO)(a) as an area with 
a census population of not less than 12,000. By 
s.26AAAB(lO)(b) if a taxpayer resides within 40 kilomet~es. 
of a centre with a population of more than 12,000, or w1th1n 
100 kilometres of a centre with a populat i on of more than 
100 OOO then he is deemed to be adjacent to an eligible 
urb~n a;ea and therefore not entitled to the discount in 
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Prima facie, it appears that section 33(1) is of similar effect 
to section 26(e) of the Australian Act in that it brings to 
charge the "value to him [i.e the taxpayer] of the 
accommodation." However, by section 33(2) the value of the 
accommodation is taken to be the market rental value of the 
premises or, if greater, the rent paid for the premises by the 
person at whose cost the accommodation is provided. Therefore 
the value of the accommodation is determined according to 
objective, rather than subjective, criteria. Unlike Australia, 
no provision is made for the value of the accommodation to be 
reduced if, for example, it is situated in a remote location or 
if onerous conditions as to use are attached. However, there is 
provision in section 33(4) for an accommodation benefit to be 
exempt from the charge to tax where the accommodation is 
necessary for the performance of the taxpayer's duties, and where 
it has been the practice in employment of the nature carried on 
by the taxpayer to provide accommodation and that accommodation 
enables the employee's duties to be performed better. 
Provision is also made in the United Kingdom for an additional 
charge in relation to more expensive accommodation. By section 
33A where the cost of providing the accommodation exceeds.{75,000 
the employee is charged on the "additional value" of the 
accommodation to the employee. The "additional value" is defined 
in section 33A(3) as "the rent which would have been payable ... if 
the premises had been let to him at an annual rent equal to the 
appropriate percentage of the amount by which the cost of 
providing the accommodation exceeds:f 75 ,OOO. 
11 Pursuant to 
section 33A(4) the "cost of providing the accommodation" is the 
aggregate of the cost of acquiring the property and any amounts 
expended on improvements to that property. And the "appropriate 
percentage" is defined in section 33A(ll) as being the rate 
prescribed by the Treasury under section 66(a) of the Finance Act 
1976. 229 Thus, the means by which the amount to be charged under 
section 33A is to be calculated may be illustrated by the 
following formula : 
Section 33A charge= (cost of providing accommodation -
4:: 75 ,OOO) x appropriate percentage. 
229. Section 66 of the Finance Act 1976 relates to the 
provision of low interest loans. Pursuant to S.I. 
1983/1273 the current prescribed rate is 12%. 
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The combined effect of sections 33 and 33A is best illustrated by 
an example. Suppose that in 1982 a company acquired a property 
at a cost of tl40,000 and that f._30,000 was subsequently spent on 
improvements. Suppose also that the taxpayer moved into the 
premises in 1983 without paying any rent. Taking the market 
rental value of the premises as{l0,000 per annum, and the 
appropriate percentage as being 12%, the emoluments chargeable to 
the taxpayer will be calculated as follows 
(a) Section 33: value of accommodation 
Market rental value 
(b) Section 33A: additional value of 
accormiodation 
Cost of providing accommodation 
Cost of improvements 
Excess amount 
Aggregate cost of providing 
accommodation 
Less: statutory exemption 
Emolument for Schedule E purpose -














Section 33: value of accommodation 10,000 





At the time of writing it appears likely that the Government will 
enact legislation to ensure that fringe benefits are taxed more 
comprehensively than at present. A number of statements have 
been made by the Hon. Mr. de Cleene, Associate Minister of 
Finance, indicating that such legislation is being 
230 contemplated, and a Treasury report strongly advocating the 
taxation of fringe benefits has recently been released.
231 That 
move towards taxing fringe benefits is not surprising for two 
reasons. First, there is no logical reason for the exclusion of 
such benefits from the tax net. It has been demonstrated in this 
paper that the present tax-free status of most fringe benefits in 
New Zealand is attributable to the method by which income is 
defined for tax purposes and to the approach of the courts in 
construing tax legislation, rather than to any intrinsic 
characteristic which renders those benefits unsusceptible to an 
income tax. Secondly, the move to tax fringe benefits is in 
keeping with the conflict indentified in the introduction to this 
paper between the need of the State to meet its expenditure 
requirements by exacting taxes from its citizens and the desire 
of the citizen to retain as much of his wealth as possible. In 
the case of employees the desire to retain one's wealth has 
manifested itself in the prevalence of fringe benefits. Now, the 
need of the State to meet its expenditure requirements through 
exactions has manifested itself in the moves to tax fringe 
benefits. Legislation already enacted in the United Kingdom and 
Canada may be regarded in that light. 
However, it is clearly too simplistic to characterise the change 
in tax status of fringe benefits as part of a wider conflict 
between the State and its citizens without having regard to the 
role of the courts. In the United States the approach taken by 
the courts in construing legislation has meant that "income" has 
230. E.g. supra n.200. 
231. The Treasury Economic Management (Government Printer, 
~ellington, July 1984)p.215. 
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been interpreted sufficiently widely as to encompass fringe 
benefits. By contrast, in New Zealand, the courts have followtd 
a much narrower path. Although the legislation appears wide 
enough to encompass fringe benefits, a conservative judicial 
approach to the construction of tax legislation has led to their 
exclusion from the tax net. To overcome that conservative 
approach, it would be necessary to follow in the footsteps of the 
United Kingdom Legislature by enacting a comprehensive regi me 
governing the tax status of fringe benefits. However, even with 
such a comprehensive regime it could be expected that the courts 
would play an important role in balancing the needs of the State 
against the desires of its citizens. 
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